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ABSTRACT 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the preeminent global 
power. China’s rise has marked it as the primary threat to the United States’ top position, 
but its economic rise alone has not been enough, and it found a ready partner in Russia to 
bolster its balancing efforts. Their mutual resentment of the U.S.-led international order 
drove them to greater cooperation, and an evolving partnership emerged. On the surface, 
this partnership appears to be a solid challenger-bloc that poses a significant threat to the 
United States’ top position. However, in the past, instances of great power competition 
spawned rivalries that escalated into costly back-and-forth exchanges between states that 
tore partnerships apart. The solidarity of the Sino-Russian partnership is seemingly facing 
stressors due to competition between them in Sub-Saharan Africa that may test the 
strength of this relationship. This thesis explores the nature of Sino-Russian competition 
in Sub-Saharan Africa using the concept of the security dilemma. In doing so, it finds 
evidence that security dilemma dynamics between China and Russia centered on Russia’s 
growing reliance on the Chinese oil and gas market are becoming an important driver of 
Russia’s activities in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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The collapse of the Soviet Union shifted the distribution of power from a bipolar to 
a unipolar system with the United States remaining as the preeminent global power. 
Despite Francis Fukuyama touting the end of history, other states emerged to balance U.S. 
power and challenge its primacy.1 China’s economic rise marked it as the primary threat 
to the United States’ position atop the international system; yet, its economic power alone 
was not enough to balance U.S. power. China found a ready partner to bolster its balancing 
efforts in Russia after sanctions imposed by the West in the aftermath of its 2014 actions 
in Ukraine threatened to isolate it from the rest of the world. China stepped in to bolster 
Russia’s economy with investments and increased oil and gas purchases, and Russia 
returned the favor by providing China with greater access to its advanced weaponry. Their 
mutual resentment of the U.S.-led international order drove them to even greater 
cooperation, and an evolving partnership emerged strengthened by a perceived common 
threat and the desire to create a more multipolar international system. On the surface, this 
partnership appears to be a solid challenger-bloc that poses a significant threat to the United 
States’ top position.  
In the past, however, instances of great power competition have spawned rivalries 
that escalated into costly back-and-forth exchanges between states that tore partnerships 
apart and ended in conflict.2 Though still in the early stages, competitive interactions 
between China and Russia in Sub-Saharan Africa—including all the states south or 
partially south of the Sahara Desert—may provide stressors that test the strength of their 
partnership. Sub-Saharan Africa, with offers of immense natural resources, enormous 
economic growth potential, and access to strategic points on the Red Sea, is an attractive 
prize for any state and has recently become a hotbed of great power competition. For China, 
                                                 
1 See Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, no. 16 (1989): 3–18, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184 and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1st ed. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
2 See Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Europe after Napoleon (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 
1973): 286–310. 
2 
its increased activity in Sub-Saharan Africa is the culmination of a long-cultivated effort 
to ensure its economy has enough fuel to sustain high growth rates, internationalize its 
corporations, and capitalize on Sub-Saharan Africa’s large consumer-base for its export 
products.3 Russia, on the other hand, is relatively new to the recent uptick in competition 
in the region and its activities are less developed. Russia seeks access to additional 
hydrocarbon resources, in Sub-Saharan Africa, as a backstop to its domestic reserves and 
to limit the sources available to the European market that it dominates.4 Also, Russia is 
taking steps to ensure access to the essential metals and minerals it needs for its industrial 
sector and is making a concerted effort to increase its economic ties and trade in the region. 
With so many intersecting activities in Sub-Saharan Africa, it appears likely that 
competition between China and Russia will flare up to jeopardize the growing partnership 
between the two in the future. However, under their new relationship dynamics, China and 
Russia have found ways to avoid competition and increase cooperation in other regions to 
maintain the strength of their partnership and keep other states out. In Central Asia, for 
example, Russia concedes to China’s economic supremacy in the region in exchange for 
maintaining its position as the region’s primary security provider.5 This arrangement is not 
only mutually beneficial for China and Russia, but also relegates the United States to a 
third-tier actor with minimal influence in the region. To avoid a similar scenario in Sub-
Saharan Africa, it is important that the United States understands the potential drivers of 
competition between China and Russia and develop policy that leverages these potential 
drivers to disrupt increased cooperation. 
One concept that may aid in this understanding is the classic concept of the security 
dilemma, which acclaimed international relations scholar Charles Glaser holds as “the key 
to understanding how in an anarchical international system states with fundamentally 
                                                 
3 Drew Thomas, “Economic Growth and Soft Power: China’s Africa Strategy,” in China in Africa, ed. 
Arthur Waldron (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2008), 13. 
4 J. Peter Pham, “Back to Africa: Russia’s New African Engagement,” in Africa and the New World 
Era from Humanitarianism to a Strategic View, ed. Mangala, Jack (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 
2010), 79, doi:10.1057/9780230117303. 
5 Simon Saradzhyan and Ali Wyne, “Sino-Russian Relations: Same Bed, Different Dreams?” In 
Power Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Mapping a Multipolar World, ed. by Donette Murray and 
David Brown, 97, (London, England: Routledge, 2018). 
3 
compatible goals still end up in competition and war.”6 First derived from works by 
Herbert Butterfield and John Herz, the basic premise of the security dilemma, as succinctly 
delineated by Posen, is “what one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, 
in the end, can make one less secure.”7 Security dilemmas are characterized by scenarios 
in which insecurity leads to escalating competition between states, and possibly war, 
despite both sides’ status quo or defensive intentions.8  
Past uses of the security dilemma to explain competitive interactions between states 
within specific cases are largely evaluative based on historical events or current dynamics 
between states.9 Few if any attempt to use the concept to get ahead of states’ activities and 
predict where and how the security dilemma is likely to manifest between states. The 
immature nature of the competitive interactions between China and Russia in Sub-Saharan 
Africa requires an approach to evaluating the security dilemma dynamics between the 
states that fills this gap. This thesis builds on the methodology used by Liff and Ikenberry 
to propose a two-level empirical examination that enables both an assessment of current 
security dilemma dynamics between China and Russia and a prediction of how they could 
drive competition between the states’ in Sub-Saharan Africa.10 Although it is difficult to 
know how states will react in the future, when making predictions in social sciences, as 
Kaplan notes, “maximum efficiency derives from a thorough knowledge of the supporting 
                                                 
6 Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054031. 
7 Butterfield developed similar thoughts as Herz in Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations 
(London: Collins, 1951), but it was Herz that coined the term “security dilemma” in John H. Herz, “Idealist 
Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157–80, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009187; Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” 
Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 28, doi:10.1080/00396339308442672. 
8 Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition 
in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,” International Security 39, no. 2 (2014): 57, 
doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00176. 
9 See for example Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?” Journal of Cold War 
Studies 3, no. 1 (2001): 36, doi:10.1162/15203970151032146; Liff and Ikenberry, “Racing Toward 
Tragedy?” 52–91; Thomas Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Social Dilemma in East 
Asia,” International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 49–80, doi:10.1162/isec.23.4.49. 
10 Liff and Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy?” 52–91. 
4 
conditions.”11 To gain this knowledge, the first level of the empirical examination 
individually assesses six conditions that indicate the intensity of security dilemma 
dynamics between China and Russia outside of Sub-Saharan Africa: the degree to which 
states’ interest are aligned, level of uncertainty/mistrust in the motives of other states, level 
of communication between states, level of vulnerability to other states’ actions, and the 
importance of expansion and self-preservation to the security of the states. The second level 
of the examination applies the knowledge gained from the external evaluation to Sub-
Saharan Africa to predict Chinese and Russian activities within the region that could 
exacerbate existing dynamics between the states. 
In exploring the security dilemma dynamics of the Sino-Russian partnership and 
their potential manifestation in Sub-Saharan Africa, this thesis finds that the potential is 
high for security dilemma dynamics with China to drive Russian activities in the future. 
China’s actions to secure its energy resources supply through Russia created an asymmetric 
vulnerability between the states that favors China and in the long-term decreases Russia’s 
overall security. Despite mostly aligned interests towards balancing U.S. primacy, security 
dilemma dynamics between China and Russia could take hold because the states have a 
shared history that created a deep-seated sense of victimization vis-à-vis one another with 
underlying fears that could result in misperceptions as to the motives of both states. The 
effectiveness of the communication processes between the states that could ameliorate 
security dilemma dynamics is questionable, as both states prefer a level of secrecy in the 
intentions of their actions. The necessity of economic expansion for Russian and Chinese 
security and the centrality of self-preservation in this expansion for the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and the Putin regime exacerbates the security dilemma dynamics between the 
two.  
Within Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia’s actions to increase its economic engagement 
and access to natural resources in the region appear to be balancing reactions to mitigate 
security dilemma dynamics with China and are not a direct reaction to its asymmetric 
                                                 
11 Oscar Kaplan, “Prediction in the Social Sciences,” Philosophy of Science 7, no. 4 (1940): 492, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/184546. 
5 
vulnerability meant to decrease China’s security. Potential flashpoints that could 
exacerbate security dilemma dynamics between China and Russia in the future include: 
China’s growing arms sales in the region, Russia’s potential entry into Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s high-tech consumer market, and Russia’s activities to obtain a greater share of the 
global hydrocarbon supply through Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. First, I outline the underlying logic of the 
security dilemma, the six conditions of the security dilemma used in the analysis, and 
factors that serve to exacerbate the dynamics from a third-party perspective. I then use the 
conditions to construct a two-level empirical test that holistically examines security 
dilemma dynamics between states outside of a specific location to facilitate predictions 
within a location under study. Third, I offer an empirical examination of the security 
dilemma dynamics between China and Russia external to a specified region and offer 
predictions on how they are likely to manifest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, I conclude 
with thoughts on how the United States could leverage security dilemma dynamics between 
China and Russia for its benefit. 
  
6 
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II. THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
Evaluating security dilemma dynamics in the present and using the results to predict 
their future manifestations is a challenging task, to say the least. Like states trapped in the 
dilemma, one cannot truly know the motives and intentions of states without the luxury 
provided by hindsight or intimate knowledge of states’ decision-making processes; nor can 
one truly know how a state will react in the future. However, the rich body of security 
dilemma literature provides ample support for conditions that at a minimum imply the 
existence of security dilemma dynamics between states and the processes that exacerbate 
these dynamics. Thoroughly examining these conditions and processes may facilitate 
useful predictions for use in policy prescription. This chapter first outlines the logic of the 
security dilemma to establish a baseline understanding of security dilemma dynamics. It 
then draws from the literature to identify six conditions that indicate the intensity of 
security dilemma dynamics between states and explore ways in which the security dilemma 
could be exacerbated. Last, the conditions derived from the literature are used to construct 
an empirical test for security dilemma dynamics between states.       
A. LOGIC OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
The security dilemma is a behavioral dynamic between states in which insecurity 
breeds competition with escalatory effects potentially leading up and to the point of war 
that, as Liff and Ikenberry note, states “would prefer to avoid if only [they] could receive 
credible commitments of the other side’s peaceful, or status quo, intentions.”12 Jervis’ 
defines a security dilemma as a scenario in which “the means by which a state tries to 
increase its security decrease the security of others.”13  
The logic of the security dilemma stems from the idea that in an anarchic 
international system, absent an overarching regulatory body, the priority of states must be 
                                                 
12 Liff and Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy?” 58.  
13 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of 
International Relations 30, no. 2 (1978): 169. 
8 
self-preservation.14 In a self-help system, states seek to increase their power for purposes 
of obtaining security to ensure their survival. For Herz, this focus on security pushes states 
to acquire increased power to counteract the power of other states.15  
Often, however, increases in power and security by one state, as Jervis points out, 
“inadvertently threatens others.”16 This is because security is often viewed, if erroneously, 
as a zero-sum game—increases in one state’s security decreases the security of others. 
States in a security dilemma are not intentionally pursuing offensive strategies or gains, 
but instead, are “status quo seekers” looking to protect what they already have.17 In an 
anarchic system, however, perceived threats promulgate fear in others, which is difficult to 
dampen because there is no true method to obtain a level of certainty as to the intentions 
or future intentions of other states.18 That is there is no way to determine if their activities 
are meant to be purely defensive or offensive or that their intentions will not change in the 
future.  
Adding to the uncertainty, the distinction between defensive and offensive 
activities is not always clear, as they are often interchangeable.19 For example, obtaining 
basing rights in one state to protect trade could enable power projection in a future conflict. 
Consequently, this fear and uncertainty create a situation in which states feel that they must 
react, or risk being at the mercy of stronger states—relegated to the fate of the weak.20 
These reactions generate what Herz labels a “vicious circle” of balancing and 
counterbalancing amongst states with each move making the other feel less secure and 
                                                 
14 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 110. 
15 Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” 157. 
16 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 170. 
17 Liff and Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy?” 58. 
18 Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?” 36. 
19 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 187. 
20 References the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War, in which the Athenians 
stated to the Melians that “since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question 
between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” taken 
from Thucydides, Robert B. Strassler, and Richard Crawley, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive 
Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York: Free Press, 1996), 352. 
9 
perpetuating the cycle.21 Ultimately, this may be self-defeating and result in the states 
being overall less secure than before the activation of the security dilemma or further 
escalated to an unwanted war in a process Jervis labels as the “Spiral Model.”22  
B. IDENTIFYING SECURITY DILEMMA DYNAMICS 
There is extensive literature with aims toward determining the scenarios and 
variables under which the dynamics of the security dilemma exist. I draw primarily from 
the seminal works of Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” and 
Charles Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” to outline six conditions that indicate 
the intensity of security dilemma dynamics between states: the degree to which states’ 
interest are aligned, level of uncertainty in the motives of other states, level of 
communication between states, level of vulnerability to other states’ actions, and the 
importance of expansion and self-preservation to the security of the states.23 Taken 
together these conditions provide strong support for identifying security dilemma dynamics 
and can serve as the basis for an evaluation between states. The six conditions are outlined 
below. 
Aligned Interests: Determining the degree to which states’ interests are aligned 
helps to distinguish competitive interactions that result from security dilemma dynamics 
from those that are the result of conflicts of interest. According to Glaser, in scenarios 
involving at least one “greedy state” that seeks to make gains beyond security, competition 
is more likely related to incompatible goals resulting from their pursuit of aggressive 
gains.24 States acting greedy is contrary to the logic of the security dilemma in which the 
escalatory reactions are amongst status quo states. If one state in a competitive scenario is 
“greedy” and actively seeking gains at the expense of the other state, then the scenario did 
not result from security dilemma dynamics and is instead a conflict of interest. Likewise, 
                                                 
21 Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” 157. 
22 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976): 62–82.  
23 See Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” and Glaser, “The Security Dilemma 
Revisited.” 
24 Glaser, 190. 
10 
if two states’ interests are aligned and potential or actual competition exists, security 
dilemma dynamics may be at play. 
Uncertainty in Motives: Identifying the factors that may cause uncertainty in 
states’ perceptions of one another’s motives helps to gauge the degree to which security 
dilemma dynamics may take hold because uncertainty in motives could lead to states 
misinterpreting actions by others as malign and incite the action-reaction cycle. This is 
congruent with Jervis’ offense-defense differentiation in which the ability to distinguish 
between offensive and defensive postures and weapons affects the level of uncertainty 
states have in the motives of other states. When defensive postures and weapons are clearly 
delineated from those centering on offense, as Jervis notes, “much of the uncertainty about 
the others intentions that contributes to the security dilemma is removed.”25 States are then 
able to improve their defensive posture and increase their security without making other 
states less secure.26 Often, however, it is difficult to differentiate between offensive and 
defensive actions or weapons because they may serve dual purposes, depending on the 
situation involved in the scenario. When the offense-defense divide is not entirely clear, 
states may misinterpret defensive actions for aggressive actions that activate the security 
dilemma and decrease the chance of cooperation.27 For Glaser, the overall information that 
states have of other states, including historical knowledge and past relationships, influence 
their perception of others’ motives and can either diminish or intensify security dilemma 
dynamics.28 For example, if states have a checkered past of animosity or aggression 
towards one another, the remnants of uncertainty as to each other’s motives may still be 
present—regardless of the current status-quo relationship—and could potentially activate 
security dilemma dynamics.  
Communication: The intensity of security dilemma dynamics between states 
partly depends on their ability to ameliorate the dynamics through transparency and 
                                                 
25 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 201. 
26 Jervis, 186 – 87. 
27 Jervis, 201. 
28 Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” 192–93. 
11 
reassurance of the intentions of their actions.29 If little communication and transparency 
exist between status quo states, their interactions are more likely to be impacted by security 
dilemma dynamics because the lack of communication perpetuates the fear and uncertainty 
as to other states’ intentions that drive the security dilemma. States with more robust 
communications have a greater opportunity to convey both the motives behind their actions 
and their interpretation of the other’s motives.30 This may remove much of the uncertainty 
between the states, reassure both of their status quo intentions, and dampen security 
dilemma dynamics. 
Vulnerability: Security dilemma dynamics are likely more intense when states are 
vulnerable because vulnerability heightens a state’s sense of fear that others will use it to 
harm the state. This prevents the state from obtaining a level of certainty in its security and 
increases its urgency to react to others’ actions. This is in-line with Jervis’ offense-defense 
balance in which the side that has the advantage determines how vulnerable a state is to an 
attack, and its ability to gain reassurance of its security. For Jervis, when defense has the 
advantage—meaning that it is easier to defend, rather than seize territory—defensive 
postures allow states to achieve a reasonable level of assurance as to their self-preservation 
that minimizes the effects of anarchy.31 Conversely, when offense has the advantage states 
are not assured of their self-preservation and fear of attack makes it impossible to increase 
security without threatening another state.32 A high level of vulnerability indicates that the 
offense has the advantage and that states should react to prevent other states from 
leveraging this vulnerability.33 This reaction may make others feel less secure and allow 
security dilemma dynamics to take hold. Conversely, if states are less vulnerable, they feel 
more secure, and the security dilemma has less room to operate. 
                                                 
29 Consistent with Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” and Glaser, “The Security 
Dilemma Revisited.” 
30 Liff and Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy?” 62. 
31 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 187. 
32 Jervis, 188–89. 
33 Jervis, 196–97. 
12 
Expansion: For Jervis, the security dilemma is most intense when “commitments, 
strategy, or technology dictate that the only route to security lies through expansion.”34 
When this is the case, states that would prefer the status quo must pursue aggressive 
policies or risk losing ground to other states due to shifts in influence and control over 
territory.35 These aggressive actions could generate a reaction in other states, despite all 
preferring security guarantees.36 
Self-Preservation: Last, the stakes involved in the activities of states is an indicator 
of the intensity of security dilemma dynamics because states are more likely to be fearful, 
misperceive other states’ actions, and overreact if survival is on the line. As Jervis argues, 
self-preservation must be the primary concern of states, and when self-preservation is at 
stake, it is impossible for another state to increase its security without threatening others.37 
As a result, states feel a heightened sense of threat which causes tension and an urgency to 
react in response to other states’ actions to ensure their survival. Although the threat to the 
survival of states in the present international system is low, certain types of governments 
such as monarchies, authoritarian regimes, and oligarchies, are the state and their activities 
may, in fact, be to ensure the survival of their regimes—which heightens the intensity of 
security dilemma dynamics. 
C. EXACERBATING THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
The security dilemma creates scenarios that are both costly and dangerous for the 
states involved. Accordingly, much of the security dilemma literature focuses on ways to 
ameliorate its dynamics. Few if any studies directly address the process by which a third-
party state could leverage the dynamics of the security dilemma to inflict costs on 
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adversarial states. Several scholars, however, propose variants of the security dilemma in 
which deliberate acts by states exacerbate its dynamics.38 
Snyder’s imperialist dilemma involves states seeking “nonsecurity [sic], 
expansionist aims,” including “political, economic, or ideological influence.”39 In doing 
so, states, who prefer compromise over war, develop offensive capabilities and engage in 
posturing to achieve their aims.40 This, in turn, incites competition over these non-security 
interests as other states seek to maintain the balance of power.41 Despite preferring to 
compromise, the competition continues to escalate because the states are unable to come 
to an agreement as a result of incompatible security interests.42  
Expounding on Snyder’s work, Collins adds the state-induced security dilemma. 
The state-induced security dilemma occurs when a state seeking to maintain the status quo 
purposefully acts aggressively to intimidate other states.43 According to Collins, the goal 
is “not to overthrow the existing status quo, but rather to consolidate it by making others 
too frightened to challenge it.”44 The overall aim of the state is to increase its absolute 
security “by requiring others to feel insecure.”45 Collins believes that in this scenario the 
security dilemma can take hold because other states cannot distinguish these types of 
aggressive acts from those of revisionist states and thus react accordingly.46 Therefore, the 
                                                 
38 Tang, however, disputes these claims and instead presents psychological and material regulators as 
the cause of exacerbated security dilemma dynamics to which third-party states may be able to leverage; 
see Shipping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 
615, doi:10.1080/09636410903133050. 
39 Jack L. Snyder, “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914,” in Psychology and Deterrence, ed. 
Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1989), 165, 156. 
40 Snyder, 165. 
41 Snyder, 166. 
42 Snyder, 166. 
43 Alan Collins, “State-Induced Security Dilemma: Maintaining the Tragedy,” Cooperation and 
Conflict 39, no. 1 (2004): 34, doi:10.1177/0010836704040833.34. 
44 Collins, 34. 
45 Collins, 34. 
46 Collins, 34. 
14 
aggressive state inflames the security dilemma through deliberate actions to gain hegemony 
over other states.47  
Similarly, Roe’s regular security dilemma involves states who base their security 
on the insecurity of others.48 Roe labels this as “required security: my security necessitates 
your insecurity.”49 In Roe’s regular security dilemma, states are not greedy states 
attempting to change the status quo but nor are they status quo states because they actively 
pursue relative gains to increase their security.50 States involved in this type of security 
dilemma do not necessarily react out of misperception, but rather out of true 
incompatibilities.51  
Wheeler and Booth add their concept of the deliberate security dilemma in which a 
security dilemma may occur under two circumstances. The first circumstance occurs when 
a status quo state pursues “deliberately offensive strategies” aimed at deterring an 
adversarial state, while still claiming to have defensive goals.52 The “offensive measures” 
taken are not meant to challenge the status quo, yet the adversarial state is caught in a 
dilemma because of the contradiction between the other’s activities and stated defensive 
intent.53 The second circumstance occurs when a revisionist state “adopts a posture 
designed to lull the target state into a false sense of security.”54 The contradiction in the 
state’s revisionist actions and its conveyed non-revisionist intent, again, activates dilemma 
dynamics between the states.55  
                                                 
47 Collins, 34. 
48 Paul Roe, “Actors’ Responsibility in `Tight’, `Regular’ Or `Loose’ Security Dilemmas,” Security 
Dialogue 32, no. 1 (2001): 108, doi:10.1177/0967010601032001008. 
49 Roe, 108. 
50 Roe, 108. 
51 Roe, 109. 
52 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, “The Security Dilemma,” in Dilemmas of World Politics: 
International Issues in a Changing World, ed. John Baylis and N. J. Rengger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992), 31. 
53 Wheeler and Booth, 31. 
54 Wheeler and Booth, 31. 
55 Wheeler and Booth, 31. 
15 
Tang, however, disputes the idea of security dilemma variants. He argues that 
because the origin of the security dilemma is structural and stems from the uncertainty and 
fear brought on by the anarchic nature of the international system, actions generated by the 
state cannot cause a security dilemma.56 Instead, Tang feels that scholars are confusing 
variants of the security dilemma with its regulators or what Wheeler and Booth call 
“aggravating factors.”57  
Tang divides regulators of the security dilemma into two types: psychological and 
material.58 Psychological regulators are the factors that affect security dilemma dynamics 
through cognitive processes and emotions that impact the decision-making of the state, 
such as fear, uncertainty, misperception, and biases. Material regulators are the observable 
or measurable factors that increase the severity of the security dilemma, such as geography, 
vulnerability, and power distribution. Material regulators intertwine with the psychological 
to exacerbate security dilemma dynamics through a process in which the physical aspects 
of the dynamics between states creates a sense of danger that poses a threat to something 
states value. This threat escalates the level of fear and uncertainty that states hold towards 
the actions of others and causes them to interpret states’ activities as malign and react 
accordingly. For Tang, this fear and uncertainty are not the structural variables that are the 
root cause of security dilemmas, but rather are self-generated in a cyclic fashion through 
misperceptions due to the inability to distinguish states’ intentions.59 In addition, as Booth 
and Wheeler point out, fears have “histories, cultures, and politics” which affect how states 
interpret threats.60 The interplay of fear and misperception of threats influenced by this 
knowledge may cause states to overvalue the threat other states pose and misjudge the 
intentions of their actions—exacerbating security dilemma dynamics.  
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The regulators of the security dilemma provide inherent avenues for third-party 
states to exacerbate dynamics between others by creating or perpetuating the inherent fears 
and misperceptions of states. As Waltz notes, one of the biggest fears that states have is 
that their interactions with others will yield unfavorable gains and create a dependency on 
others.61 Third-party states could perpetuate this thought by generating a negative threat 
perception in the eyes of the targeted state through consistently highlighting the 
asymmetries in the interactions of states through various means of influence such as media, 
academia, and international forums. This could create doubt in the intensions of other states 
actions and cause the targeted state to react in kind.  
Third-party states could also take actions to increase a targeted state’s vulnerability 
resulting from its dependence on others to exacerbate security dilemma dynamics. When 
the security of a state is disproportionately tied to another state, the latter has the “offensive 
advantage” and can harm the state through actions that impact the source of this 
vulnerability. Keohane and Nye define vulnerability in terms of “the relative availability 
and costliness of the alternatives” that could alleviate a dependency.62 States are more 
vulnerable to the actions of other states if the cost of alternatives is higher for them relative 
the other.63 Third-party states could take actions to increase the cost of alternatives for 
targeted states to deepen their dependency on other states. This would further decrease the 
security of targeted states and may cause reactions to mitigate vulnerabilities or counter 
other states’ actions that perpetuate the vulnerability in an escalation of the security 
dilemma. 
Last, third-party states could play into states’ preconceived perceptions and biases 
towards other states to increase ambiguity in others’ actions that may escalate security 
dilemma dynamics. Things such as past interactions, shared histories, and biases can 
perpetuate underlying fears which lead to uncertainty in the motives of states. Third-party 
states could take actions that uses these fears to sow doubt in the intentions of  states actions 
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such as accentuating similar ideology or ethnic backgrounds in interactions with targeted 
states, emphasizing states underlying fears towards others in state rhetoric and policy, or 
highlighting past negative interactions between targeted states to their leaders and people, 
which may cause states to misinterpret the intent of others’ actions and initiate an action-
reaction cycle that exacerbates security dilemma dynamics between the states. 
D. EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION FOR SECURITY DILEMMA DYNAMICS 
Liff and Ikenberry are correct when they state that, “the transition from the realm 
of abstract theory to the empirical world is often treacherous” and “rarely do real-world 
cases fit neatly into the theoretical boxes in which scholars place them.”64 This is never 
truer than when attempting to use theory to evaluate the motives and intentions of states 
without access to their decision-making process. Nevertheless, this thesis attempts to 
develop an empirical examination that provides support for its findings by grounding its 
questions with solid theoretical underpinnings that enable a relatively accurate portrayal of 
the security dilemma dynamics between China and Russia and their application to Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
This thesis takes its approach from Liff and Ikenberry, to develop a two-level, 
seven-question empirical examination based on the previously outlined six conditions of 
security dilemma dynamics.65 The first level focuses on gauging the intensity of security 
dilemma dynamics and identifying ways in which the security dilemma could manifest 
between China and Russia independent of a specified region. The second level of the 
examination applies the knowledge gained from the external evaluation to Sub-Saharan 
Africa to first identify two types of balancing reactions to security dilemma dynamics: 
those that exacerbate the dynamics and those that mitigate the dynamics. Balancing 
reactions that exacerbate security dilemma dynamics are reactions to a decrease in security 
which counters the initial action in a security dilemma in a way which decreases the 
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security of other states and could generate a counterreaction. Arms races are an example 
of this type of balancing in which states attempt to gain a level of superiority over others’ 
military capability. Balancing reactions that mitigate security dilemma dynamics are those 
that are a reaction to a decrease in security that do not directly counter another state’s 
actions or decrease the other’s security but are instead undertaken to increase the state’s 
overall security. An example of this type of balancing is a state increasing its economic 
capacity without direct harm to other states. Next, the second level uses the external 
assessment to predict actions by China and Russia within Sub-Saharan Africa that could 
exacerbate existing dynamics between the states. These levels should not be viewed as 
mutually exclusive of one another, but rather as part of a holistic assessment. The empirical 
questions by level follow. 
1. Between China and Russia  
• Are the states’ interests aligned? (Glaser) 
 
• Are there factors that cause uncertainty in the states’ motives relative to 
each other? (Jervis, Glaser) 
 
• What is the level of communication between the states? (Jervis, Glaser) 
 
• Where do the security interests of the states intersect and to what degree 
does this intersection create vulnerability within the state? (Jervis) 
 
• To what degree do expansion and self-preservation impact the security of 
the states? (Jervis) 
2. Within Sub-Saharan Africa 
• Do the states’ actions in the region appear to be a reaction to a decrease in 
security vis-à-vis the other state? 
 
• What activities by the states in the region could exacerbate security dilemma 
dynamics between the states? 
 
In the following chapter, I utilize the empirical questions to analyze the current 
Chinese – Russian relationship and interactions to outline the nature and extent of security 
dilemma dynamics between the states. My objective is to determine the extent to which 
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security dilemma dynamics are present in their partnership, how they drive their activities 
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III. EVALUATING CHINESE AND RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
This chapter first explores the security dilemma dynamics between China and 
Russia without reference to a specific area. This is done to gauge the intensity of security 
dilemma dynamics within the relationship and identify factors that may impact the 
manifestation of the security dilemma within Sub-Saharan Africa. I then proceed to explore 
possible reactions to security dilemma dynamics between China and Russia Sub-Saharan 
Africa and activities that could exacerbate the dynamics in the future.  
A. EVALUATION BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA 
Evaluating state interactions for security dilemma dynamics in a specific region 
first requires an appraisal of the external dynamics that may influence those within the 
specified region. External factors such as the alignment of states’ interests, causes of 
uncertainty in motives, level of communication between the states, and the intersection of 
their security interests help identify security dilemma dynamics between states by 
eliminating potential conflicts of interest and providing a basis for spotting areas where the 
security dilemma is likely to appear. This section evaluates the relationship between China 
and Russia for these dynamics by answering five distinct questions: Are the states’ interests 
aligned? Are there factors that may cause uncertainty in the motives of the states? What is 
the level of communication between the states? Where do the security interests of the states 
intersect and to what degree does this intersection create vulnerability within the states? To 
what degree do expansion and self-preservation impact the security of the states? 
In answering these questions, I find that the potential is high for security dilemma 
dynamics with China to drive Russian activities in the future. China’s actions to secure its 
energy resources supply through Russia created an asymmetric vulnerability between the 
states that favors China and in the long-term decreases Russia’s overall security. Despite, 
China and Russia’s largely aligned mutual interests centered around balancing U.S. 
primacy, Russia’s decrease in security is likely to generate a reaction from the state. 
Security dilemma dynamics between China and Russia are likely to take hold because the 
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states have a shared history that created a deep-seated sense of victimization vis-à-vis one 
another, with underlying fears that could result in misperceptions as to the motives of both 
states. Robust interstate communications processes between the states that could 
ameliorate the security dilemma are present, but the level of transparency within these 
communications is questionable. Both states prefer a level of secrecy in the intentions of 
their actions, which decreases the potential of their communications to dampen security 
dilemma dynamics. Last, the necessity of economic expansion for Chinese and Russian 
security and the centrality of self-preservation in this expansion for the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and Putin regime exacerbates security dilemma dynamics between the two. 
This section proceeds by answering the four empirical questions and is followed by a 
discussion of the results.  
1. Are Chinese and Russian Interests Aligned? 
The degree to which Chinese and Russian interests are aligned is an elimination 
criterion in the evaluation of security dilemma dynamics between the states because it 
distinguishes security dilemma scenarios from those characterized by conflicts of interest. 
As Liff and Ikenberry note, states in a security dilemma are “status quo seekers” and do 
not intentionally engage in offensive activities vis-à-vis other states.66 If at least one state 
in a competitive scenario is “greedy” and pursues aggressive actions at the expense of 
another or if the interests of the states are fundamentally misaligned, this indicates malign 
intentions on the part of the states and the potential or actual action-reaction cycle is likely 
a result of a conflict of interest vice security dilemma dynamics. Whereas, if states’ 
interests are aligned and potential or actual competition exists, then the presence of security 
dilemma dynamics remains a possibility. In examining the degree to which Chinese and 
Russian interests are aligned, this section finds that the resentment of the U.S.-led 
international order drove China and Russia to align their interests in response to what they 
view as a disproportionate amount of power afforded the United States relative their own. 
Evidence of which can be found in their increased defense ties and activities in multilateral 
organizations. China and Russia are not “greedy” towards one another and prefer to take a 
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pragmatic approach where potential conflicts of interest exist. As such, security dilemma 
dynamics are likely drivers of potential or actual competition between the states and not 
conflicts of interest. 
The U.S.-led efforts to punish Russia for the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and its 
2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine led to a resurgence in cooperation between 
Beijing and Moscow, with both China and Russia finding in each other a path to thwarting 
U.S. attempts at policing the world. China readily increased its oil imports from Russia, 
which dampened the impact of Western sanctions, and Russia increased both the quantity 
and quality of arms sales to China as it looked to grow its military to match its rising 
economic power under the constraints of its own Western arms embargo. This relationship 
continued to blossom as both shared the view that the unequal amount of power yielded by 
the United States gave it a global reach that encroached on their spheres of influence and 
presented a threat to their territorial integrity and regimes.67 They view the revolutions in 
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in the early 2000s and the toppling of several 
authoritarian regimes such as those in Iraq and Libya, as demonstrations of the reality of 
this threat.68  In addition, the U.S. National Missile Defense agenda unified China and 
Russia against what they perceive as a blatant attempt by the United States to contain them 
and limit their ability to defend their interests.69  
Recently, several scholars point out that this mutual resentment strengthened the 
Sino-Russian connection with classifications of the relationship ranging from on the verge 
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of a strategic partnership to an unofficial full-fledged alliance.70 Russian President 
Vladimir Putin emphasized the reason for increased cooperation between the two in 2012 
stating that “Beijing shares our vision of the emerging equitable world order.”71 Likewise, 
in 2018, after awarding Putin China’s first friendship medal, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
stated that “in the face of a complex international situation,…China and Russia will 
increase mutual support and coordination in international affairs and deepen strategic 
cooperation.”72 Overall, China’s economic standing affords it a level of power that it feels 
warrants more considerable influence over the international system, while Russia has 
always viewed itself as a great power and seeks its “natural” place in the upper-echelon of 
states. Both of whom view U.S. primacy as standing in opposition to these goals, and the 
multipolar world they both seek to promote.  
As a result of this growing partnership, China and Russia progressively increased 
their defense ties in ways that indicate they view one another as important partners in 
standing against U.S. primacy and that neither anticipates a conflict of interest. Both 
Schwartz and Røseth note that a deepening of the defense relationship between the two 
occurred in 2016 after Russia began to deliver on several major arms agreements signed in 
the previous year.73 In 2016, Russia delivered the first group of a scheduled 24 of Russia’s 
                                                 
70 Saradzhyan and Wyne, “Sino-Russian Relations,” 91; Sutter, “America’s Bleak View of Russia-
China Relations,” 39; Alexey D. Muraviev, “Comrades in Arms: The Military-Strategic Aspects of China–
Russia Relations,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 1, no. 2 (2014): 169, 
doi:10.1177/2347797014536638; Keun-Wook Paik, Sino-Russian Gas and Oil Cooperation: Entering into 
a New Era of Strategic Partnership? (Oxford, UK: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2015), 40; 
Alexander Korolev, “Systemic Balancing and Regional Hedging: China-Russia Relations,” Chinese 
Journal of International Politics 9, no. 4 (2016): 375; Tom Røseth, “Russia’s Energy Relations with China: 
Passing the Strategic Threshold?” Eurasian Geography and Economics 58, no. 1 (2017): 48, 
doi:10.1080/15387216.2017.1304229; Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance,” 3, 8; Alexander Korolev, 
“Beyond the Nominal and the Ad Hoc: The Substance and Drivers of China-Russia Military Cooperation,” 
Insight Turkey 20, no. 1 (2018b): 28, doi:10.25253/99.2018201.02; Tom Røseth, “Moscow’s Response to a 
Rising China: Russia’s Partnership Policies in its Military Relations with Beijing,” Problems of Post-
Communism (2018): 1–2, doi:10.1080/10758216.2018.1438847.  
71 Vladimir V. Putin, “Russia and the Changing World,” Sputnik News, last modified February 27, 
2012, https://sputniknews.com/analysis/20120227171547818/. 
72 Ben Blanchard and Denis Pinchuk, “China’s Xi Awards ‘Best Friend’ Putin Friendship Medal, 
Promises Support,” Reuters, June 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-russia/chinas-xi-
awards-best-friend-putin-friendship-medal-promises-support-idUSKCN1J41RO. 
73 Paul Schwartz, “Russia-China Defense Cooperation: New Developments,” The ASAN Forum, 
February 9, 2017, http://www.theasanforum.org/russia-china-defense-cooperation-new-developments/; 
Røseth, “Moscow’s Response to a Rising China,” 2. 
25 
most advanced fighter jet, the Su-35—making China the first state other than Russia to 
receive it.74 This delivery was followed in 2017 by the transfer of the first of six battalions 
of S-400 air defense systems and several Kamov helicopters and Russian engines for use 
in Chinese jets and bombers.75 This weaponry significantly increases China’s anti-
access/area-denial capabilities and serves to undermine U.S. military power in Taiwan and 
the South China Sea and overall decreases the relative power of the United States and its 
allies vis-à-vis China.76 This arms transfer also increases China’s military power relative 
to Russia and could be used against Russia in the event of a dispute on their shared 
border.77 Russia’s willingness to transfer weapons that China could use to harm both it and 
the United States indicates that Russia does not foresee a large-scale conflict of interest 
with China and instead focus on their shared goal of balancing the United States. 
China and Russia’s increased military-to-military cooperation also indicates that 
the states’ interests are aligned, and they have used this cooperation to signal their solidarity 
in opposing U.S. primacy. Joint military exercises between China and Russia have steadily 
grown in both size and scope since the initial development of their “Peace Mission” 
exercises in 2004.78 Joint exercises between the states now occur every one to two years 
and evolved from scenarios focused on revolutions and other political strife to those aimed 
at third-party states.79 The latest exercise, VOSTOK 2018, was the largest joint exercise 
between the two states to date—with between 75,000 and 100,000 Russian troops and 
around 3,000 Chinese troops participating—and the first to openly highlight scenarios that 
involved a third-party “enemy” in which combined forces from Russia, China, and 
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Mongolia maneuvered against other conventional forces.80 Though the official purpose of 
the exercise from the Chinese government was to develop the “China-Russia 
comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination,” China’s state-sponsored media 
published editorials which signal that China views the exercise in terms of solidifying a 
Sino-Russian partnership to counter the United States, with one op-ed viewing the exercise 
as part of a broader “reasonable stance” against “hegemonic powers [that] target China and 
Russia.”81 For Russia, the inclusion of a state-based opposition force in the exercise and 
the emphasis placed on the scenario when describing the exercise to the rest of the world, 
signals to the West and China that it foresees potential opposition to its return as a great 
power from the United States and views China as a partner to counter this effort and not as 
an adversary.82   
Last, Chinese and Russian shared activities in multilateral organizations provide 
further indication of their aligned interests against U.S. primacy. Both China and Russia 
view the United Nations (UN) as an essential forum to shape changes to the U.S.-led 
international system and promote multipolarity and have jointly used it to advance this 
effort.83 In 1997 they introduced a “Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the 
Establishment of a New World Order,” which according to Stronski and Ng is as an “early 
indication of their common resentment of Western dominance” and demonstrates their 
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willingness to work together to change the system.84 They often synchronize their standing 
on issues and use their status as permanent members of the UN Security Council to veto 
efforts that oppose common interests such as concerns over the sovereignty of other 
states.85 A recent demonstration of this occurred when, on four separate occasions between 
2011 and 2014, China and Russia vetoed U.S.-backed UN resolutions on Syria that would 
have enabled a joint effort to remove the Assad regime from power.  
China and Russia are also founding and leading members of other multilateral 
organizations that seek to provide an alternative to U.S.-led security and economic 
apparatuses including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. The 
SCO is quickly becoming a formidable organization and includes four of the top ten most 
populous countries in the world in China, India, Pakistan, and Russia, all of which are 
nuclear powers and possess sizable militaries with growing capabilities.86 In addition, 
including the organization’s other members, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan, the SCO states encompass most of the landmass of Eurasia and possess 
significant energy reserves in the form of oil, natural gas, and coal. The SCO continues to 
improve relations amongst its members through regular military exercises and cooperation 
on various economic issues and initiatives and presents an attractive alternative to the U.S.-
led security organizations for non-Western states.  
The BRICS collective also provides China and Russia with a forum to promote an 
alternative to U.S. global leadership. On July 7, 2015, the BRICS organization activated 
its New Development Bank to support “fast, flexible, and efficient” development projects 
in emerging countries throughout the world.87 Initiatives such as the New Development 
Bank provide states with alternatives to condition-based Western investments that often 
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require significant governmental and economic reforms that many states are reluctant to 
make. This positions China and Russia to gain greater influence and support in developing 
states and increase their ability to oppose U.S. primacy. The New Development Bank also 
utilizes the Chinese Renminbi as its primary currency which, Korolev feels “represents an 
eloquent attempt to break the dominance of the U.S. dollar in global trade, as well as dollar-
backed institutions.”88 
Nevertheless, China and Russia face potential conflicts of interest in their 
traditional spheres of influence in places such as Vietnam, Central Asia, and the Arctic. 
China and Vietnam are engaged in a hotly contested dispute over claims to the Paracel and 
Spratly island chains in the South China Sea. In light of this dispute, Russia continues its 
arms sales to Vietnam which reportedly included the sale of six new Kilo-type submarines 
in 2017 and a new sales agreement worth an estimated one-billion dollars in 2018.89 In 
addition, Russia’s state-owned energy company, Gazprom, came to an agreement with the 
Vietnamese government in 2012 to extract natural gas from Vietnam’s continental shelf in 
the South China Sea, despite requests from Beijing not to proceed.90  
In Central Asia, China is actively seeking access to the region’s energy reserves 
and economic markets and has increased its influence through development projects as part 
of its Belt and Road Initiative. Russia, on the other hand, views Chinese encroachment as 
contrary to its security and economic interests in one of its most valued traditional spheres 
of influence.91 In the Arctic, China and Russia have diverging interests on the ultimate fate 
of the region. Climate change in the Arctic will likely result in improved access to an 
estimated 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas and 13% of its undiscovered oil 
and open up the shorter and potentially cheaper Northern Shipping Route from China’s 
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east coast to European markets in the West.92 China seeks to “internationalize” the region 
to allow it freedom of navigation to the European marketplace and to gain access to the 
region’s oil and gas and has asserted itself as a “Near Arctic State” in the affairs of the 
region.93 Russia opposes interference from non-arctic states in determining the region’s 
fate and looks to economically capitalize on the region by charging fees for the use of the 
route and ensuring sovereignty over the hydrocarbon resources in its claimed Arctic 
territory.94 Russia also views the opening of the Arctic in terms of the negative impact it 
has on its security in which maintaining sovereignty over its claimed territories within the 
region is integral to the security of its northern shores.95 
These potential conflicts of interest between China and Russia, however, are not 
likely to result in a divergence from their greater interest in countering U.S. primacy, as 
both prefer to take a pragmatic approach in areas of potential conflict while avoiding areas 
they cannot.96 China and Russia rarely criticize each other publicly and instead prefer to 
find common ground. As Korolev points out, China’s stance in response to Russian 
activities in Crimea, despite being contrary to its position on an independent Taiwan, were 
never openly negative and Russia does not criticize China’s stance in the South China Sea 
despite its relationship with Vietnam.97 Instead, China chose to prevent the United States 
from isolating Russia by increasing trade and security cooperation in the aftermath of the 
annexation of Crimea, while Russia signaled its support for China in the South China Sea 
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by sending naval vessels into contested waters in 2018.98 In addition, China and Russia 
continue to work together to foster cooperation in areas where there interests conflict. In 
Central Asia, Russia has conceded to China’s economic role in the region, while China 
relies on Russia to maintain security.99 Likewise, in the Arctic, China has increased its 
investment in Russian infrastructure and partnered with Russia for continued energy 
exploration in the region.  
Overall, China and Russia have largely aligned interests in opposing U.S. primacy, 
which resulted in increased economic, military, and diplomatic cooperation. Where 
potential conflicts of interest exist, China and Russia take a pragmatic approach to finding 
areas for cooperation and avoiding conflict. China and Russia are not “greedy” in relation 
to each other and are not likely to have malign intent towards one another. As such, security 
dilemma dynamics are likely drivers of potential or actual competition between the states 
and not conflicts of interest. 
2. Are There Factors that Cause Uncertainty in the Motives of China 
and Russia? 
Identifying the factors that may cause uncertainty in China and Russia’s perception 
of one another’s motives helps to determine the degree to which security dilemma 
dynamics may take hold because uncertainty could lead to states misinterpreting actions 
by the other as malign and incite the action-reaction cycle. In exploring these factors, this 
section finds that China and Russia have an arduous past filled with interactions that left 
the residue of fears which may impact how each interprets the actions of the other. Russia’s 
fear of subjugation and retaliation and both states’ fear of encirclement leaves an aura of 
uncertainty in the collective psyche of the states which increases the probability that 
security dilemma dynamics are at play in competitive interactions between the two. 
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Russia’s fear of subjugation and retaliation and both China and Russia’s fears of 
encirclement may cause uncertainty in their perception of one another’s actions. Russia’s 
fear of subjugation by China stems from the 13th century CE when the Mongol Empire 
conquered much of what was to become Russia and subjugated its people for 250 years.100 
In his detailed analysis of Russia’s perceptions of China, Lukin found that images of the 
“yellow peril” emanating from this period are still prevalent in Russia and continues to 
impact perceptions of China in the 21st century.101 Russia deeply resents the Mongol rule 
which left a persistent trepidation of China and the subjugation Russia endured during this 
period.102 As a result, Russia is cautious in its partnership with China and is extremely 
sensitive to the possibility of Chinese subjugation in the form of regional and international 
hegemony. Although China continues to proselytize its view of a more balanced multipolar 
system, Russia’s fear of Chinese subjugation may cause it to question the true motives of 
Chinese activities regarding this view. This fear and uncertainty will likely increase as the 
distribution of power between the two continues to widen in favor of China. Røseth found 
tacit references to threats posed by China’s rise in current Russian strategic documents and 
an “inherent ambivalence in Russia’s security relations with China” despite their increased 
cooperation.103 This uncertainty could cause Russia to react to China’s activities out of 
fear that their actions are meant to achieve a level of hegemony over Russia to force it to 
submit to China’s will—inciting security dilemma dynamics.  
Russia’s fear of retaliation from China may also increase its uncertainty in the 
motives of China’s actions. During periods when Russia possessed the preponderance of 
power relative to China, it was not always equal in their interactions. In the 1800s, Russia 
capitalized on several of China’s internal rebellions and the Opium War to occupy and 
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annex over 1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory through what Brenton calls 
a “series of unequal treaties.”104 Russia inflicted further costs on China by enabling the 
Mongol rebellion in 1910 and establishing Outer Mongolia as a Russian protectorate after 
it broke away from China in 1911. China views the loss of this territory as part of the 
“Century of Humiliation” from which it derives motivation for its rise to the top of the 
international system and the reversal of the losses suffered during this period.105 The 
territory that Russia annexed, which now encompasses its Far East, are still viewed as 
Chinese territory by many Chinese nationals and China may want to reclaim this territory 
in the future.106 Russian exodus from the region and its failure to develop and modernize 
the area, coupled with vibrant Chinese cities with over 110 million people pressing on the 
border heightens this sense.107 The Russian Far East also contains an abundance of 
untapped natural resources that China needs to drive its economy. As China continues to 
increase its power, the possibility of China taking back this area becomes ever more 
credible in the eyes of Russia and creates greater uncertainty in its perception of China’s 
motives that could prompt a hostile reaction from Russia. 
Similarly, Russia took advantage of China during the Soviet-era, which may also 
elicit fear of Chinese retaliation that creates uncertainty in its perceptions of Chinese 
actions. Russia’s preponderance of power over the new Communist People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) during the Soviet-era allowed it to play a “paternal” or “big brother” role to 
the fledgling state. China looked to its communist brethren in the Soviet Union for support 
as it attempted to remake the state in the image of communism after the revolution. 
However, instead of real support, Soviet Russia took advantage of China by implementing 
stipulations on aid that were disproportionately unfavorable to China. As Bolton states, the 
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Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance that China hoped would provide 
Soviet support for its rise was “humiliating and debilitating.”108 Soviet Russia required 
food as compensation for assistance in amounts that were beyond China’s capacity at the 
time and caused famine in some parts of China that were the precursor to the “Great 
Famine.”109 Soviet Russia also spread the $300 million loan that was part of the treaty 
over five years and limited the number of Chinese investment projects to 50, which were 
much less than those requested by China.110 China was additionally forced to concede 
access to Manchuria and Xinjiang’s mineral resources to Russia which prompted Chang 
and Halliday to view this as “effectively signing away most of China’s tradable assets.”111 
By and large, the so-called Soviet support that the PRC needed in its critical initial stage 
of development was actually a demonstration of Soviet superiority in which it used its 
power to take advantage of Chinese weakness. In the current international system, 
however, the roles are reversed. China now has the preponderance of power relative to 
Russia and Russia relies on China to prop-up its economy through hydrocarbon resource 
and weapons purchases. Russia’s fear of retaliatory practices could cause it to view China’s 
activities as exploitative and result in uncertainty in Russia as to the true nature of the 
partnership. Russia may, in turn, react under the tension of this fear and uncertainty setting 
off security dilemma dynamics. 
Last, both states’ fears of encirclement may cause uncertainty in the motives of 
each other’s actions which could incite security dilemma dynamics. Attempts by each state 
to improve relations with the United States dotted the recent history of the Sino-Russian 
relationship and incited a fear of encirclement within each other at various points. The first 
instance occurred during the Soviet Union’s Khrushchev era. Nikita Khrushchev assumed 
power after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and sought reforms which caused the PRC’s 
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leader, Mao Zedong to consider him a traitor to the Stalinist ideology.112 He denounced 
Stalin’s policies in his 1956 “Secret Speech” at the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress 
and made references to normalizing relations with the United States.113 This heightened 
the fear of encirclement in China and contributed to the ideological divide and contentious 
relationship between China and Russia that lasted into the 1980s.114  
Russia experienced the same fear as a result of China’s détente with the United 
States in the 1970s. Early in the 1970s, the U.S. view of China began to shift as it began to 
open to the outside world. The Sino-Soviet relationship during this time was still fractured 
and the United States, under President Nixon, took advantage of this divide and China’s 
newfound willingness to cooperate to improve U.S.-Chinese relations in an attempt to 
“stretch the Soviet Union on two fronts.”115 Desperately needing increased trade and 
investments from the West after the disastrous “Great Leap Forward” and a way to contain 
Soviet power, China reacted favorably to U.S. rapprochement. This triggered Soviet-
Russia’s own fear of encirclement, and it responded in-kind with its attempt at a détente 
with the United States—perpetuating the fear.116 
Russia continued to propagate the fear of encirclement in China throughout the 
1990s and into the present as subsequent leaders from Yeltsin to Putin went back and forth 
between favoring the United States and China. Compounding the issue, China is cognizant 
of Russia’s foreign policy obsession with the West and its European roots, which Brenton 
feels causes its favor to wane according to where it stands with the West.117 This may 
cause China to question the reliability of the Russian partnership which could result in 
uncertainty in the actions of Russia and cause it to react to prevent encirclement.  
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For Russia, the fear of encirclement persists as a result of China’s economic 
interdependence with the United States. China’s rise was significantly enabled by the 
current U.S.-led international system that allowed it to become a manufacturing giant and 
capitalize on the global free-market economy. China is steadfast in its quest to continue its 
economic modernization and expansion to which the United States is integral. The United 
States provides China with its largest export market, totaling $479.7 billion in 2018, 
secures the sea-lanes that enable China to export its goods and import energy resources, 
and provides China access to technology and education—all of which are vital to its 
economic growth.118 As a result, China is less willing than Russia to more aggressively 
challenge U.S. primacy in the international system despite sharing Russia’s view on 
multipolarity. This has led some scholars to question whether China would choose Russia 
over the United States if a conflict between them involved high economic stakes for 
China.119 China’s unwillingness to more significantly challenge the United States and 
disrupt their economic ties coupled with NATO’s eastern expansion could incite Russia’s 
fear of encirclement that causes it to question Chinese motives and misinterpret its actions 
as hostile. 
Overall, China and Russia’s shared history left both with a sense of victimization 
and level of doubt in their commitment to the partnership that heightens the potential for 
security dilemma dynamics between the two.120 Both Russia’s victimization at the hands 
of the Mongol Empire and its own victimization of China during the Soviet era, intertwine 
to form a sense of fear in Russia that creates uncertainty in the motives of China’s actions. 
China’s preponderance of power increases Russia’s fear of Chinese subjugation and China 
disproportionately benefitting from their interactions. Additionally, both states have 
demonstrated a lack of commitment to the partnership in the past and have chosen the 
United States over the other at various points. Although China and Russia’s opposition to 
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U.S. primacy contributed to the formation of their partnership, both states have ties to the 
United States which causes them to fear that the other may switch allegiances and encircle 
the other—Russia’s heritage and ethnic background and China’s economic ties. As such, 
the potential for Russia and China to misperceive each other’s actions as the result of 
uncertainty derived from these fears is ever-present and increases the potential for an 
action-reaction cycle between the states. 
3. What Is the Level of Communication between China and Russia? 
An evaluation of the level of communication between China and Russia assists with 
gauging the potential for security dilemma dynamics between the states because the degree 
to which states communicate indicates the level of transparency and reassurance between 
the two, which may ameliorate security dilemma dynamics.121 States with more robust 
communications have a greater opportunity to convey both the motives behind their actions 
and their interpretation of the other’s motives.122 This may remove much of the uncertainty 
between the states and reassure both of their status quo intentions, which serves to dampen 
security dilemma dynamics. For China and Russia, their increased cooperation resulted in 
a robust interstate communications apparatus in which they have ample opportunity to 
clarify uncertainties in each other’s actions; however, their secretive nature, the persistent 
mistrust between the states, and their pragmatism call into question the level of 
transparency in these interactions and their ability to ameliorate security dilemma 
dynamics. 
In his analysis of the post-Cold War China-Russia relationship, Korolev found that 
China and Russia developed a robust interstate communications apparatus in parallel with 
their increased cooperation.123 This apparatus evolved from the 1993 Military Cooperation 
Agreement between the states and consists of numerous meetings and interactions 
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institutionalized across all levels of government within both states.124 Bilateral 
consultations now occur up to 30 times per year with a primary focus on shared security 
issues.125 One of the most notable bilateral meetings between the two is the Russia-China 
Consultation on National Security Issues which begun in 2004 and involves the heads of 
the Russian Security Council and the Chinese State Council. This meeting takes place four 
times a year to address pressing joint national security concerns and promote continued 
“good neighborliness” between the states.126 In addition, China and Russia routinely hold 
separate meetings at multilateral forums to discuss security issues and synchronize their 
positions. These include not only the highly publicized one-on-one meetings between Putin 
and Xi but also meetings between a broad array of other top government officials to discuss 
issues related to their areas of expertise. Often, these meetings result in joint expressions 
on key security issues meant to convey solidarity to external audiences.  
Despite the volume and depth of Sino-Russian interstate communications, the 
actual amount of transparency in these meetings is difficult to know. Traditionally, 
suspicion characterizes Chinese and Russian approaches to foreign policy and both states 
have a history of secretive international relations.127 According to Pillsbury, China values 
deception and ambiguity over transparency and the works of Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-tung, 
two masters of deceptive stratagem, carry significant influence in China.128 Throughout 
most of its current rise, China followed Deng Xiaopong’s “hide one’s capacities and bide 
one’s time” approach to foreign policy.129 China is often reluctant to disclose the nature 
of its foreign policy with other states, and seemingly, minor activities such as the amount 
of foreign aid that China provides to a state is still tightly guarded. 
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For its part, Russia carries with it the legacy of the deceptive nature of the Soviet 
Union, which instilled a culture of secrecy throughout the state. Lo argues that Russia has 
two “policy milieus”—the real and the virtual—in which the virtual is what the rest of the 
world sees in its policy documents and press releases, while the real decisions remain secret 
with little input from most of Russia’s politicians.130 This secretive nature calls into 
question both Russia’s willingness to be transparent and the ability of Russian officials to 
reassure China in their consultations as a result of a lack of actual knowledge of the states’ 
intent.  
China and Russia also maintain a level of mutual distrust, which stems from the 
deeply rooted history and fears previously discussed, which may also hinder transparency 
in their communications.131 In addition, despite the close relationship, China and Russia 
do not have an actual alliance. In 2016, Fu Ying, the former Deputy Foreign Minister of 
China, wrote an article for Foreign Affairs in which she made it clear that China has no 
desire to formalize an alliance with Russia and instead wants to focus on “mutually 
beneficial cooperation.”132 In line with this statement, Chinese and Russian interactions 
remain pragmatic and tend to focus on areas of agreement and shy away from those they 
do not.133 This could limit the ability of their communications to ameliorate security 
dilemma dynamics in areas or activities with a less direct line to their shared interests or in 
which they disagree. Moreover, Smith posits that without the norms, values, and standards 
that a formalized alliance brings, states who base their partnerships around “each partner’s 
relative national power, security and prestige in relation to other international actors,” such 
as the current China-Russia partnership, still view their relationship as zero-sum.134 This 
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zero-sum mentality makes it less likely that China and Russia are entirely transparent in 
their communications.  
Taken as a whole, China and Russia’s secretive natures, mutual mistrust, and 
pragmatic relationship may limit the level of transparency the states have in their 
interactions despite ample communications processes. This serves to perpetuate any 
uncertainties that they may have in the intent of one another’s actions. As a result, the 
likelihood that the states could misinterpret the activities of the other as malign, and react 
accordingly, is increased despite their overall status-quo intentions. 
4. Where Do the Security Interests of China and Russia Intersect and to 
What Degree Does this Intersection Create Vulnerability within the 
States?  
Determining the degree to which states are vulnerable to others’ actions indicates 
the intensity of security dilemma dynamics because vulnerability heightens a state’s sense 
of fear that others will use the vulnerability to harm the state. This prevents the state from 
obtaining a level of certainty in its security and increases its urgency to react to others’ 
actions. Identifying where states’ security interests intersect provides a basis for 
discovering areas in which vulnerabilities may exist. 
China and Russia’s security interests intersect most prominently in the essentiality 
of energy resources to their economies. China requires vast amounts of energy resources 
to fuel its export-based manufacturing economy and is by far the world’s largest energy 
consumer with 1,970 million (metric) tonnes of oil equivalent consumed in 2018.135 For 
its part, Russia is a hydrocarbon state and is the third-largest producer of oil, the second-
largest producer of dry natural gas, and is one of the world’s top producers of coal.136 In 
early 2019, the Russian Natural Resources Environment Ministry estimated that Russia’s 
hydrocarbon resources amount to approximately 60% of its gross domestic product 
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(GDP).137 In 2018, revenues generated from the export of hydrocarbon resources totaled 
$US 237.6 billion for Russia.138 In comparison, its next highest revenue-generating export 
was iron and steel which totaled just $US 23.4 billion.139 China’s demand for oil and gas 
is estimated to continue to increase by 1.3% and 4.6% yearly until 2040, and with Russia’s 
extensive oil and gas resources, coupled with the states’ proximity, an energy partnership 
is the natural outgrowth of their relationship.140 Currently, China is Russia’s largest 
individual customer with over $US 34.5 billion worth of hydrocarbons purchased in 2018 
and Russia is China’s largest supplier with an 11% share of its imports.141 This resulted in 
what many scholars recognize as an economic interdependence between the states.142 
However, Russia’s reliance on China for hydrocarbon sales is increasing as a result of its 
lack of diversification in its Asia-Pacific customer base and greater competition in both the 
Asia-Pacific and European markets. In contrast, China ensures that it is not over-reliant on 
Russia by maintaining access to highly diversified energy sources. As a result, an 
asymmetric vulnerability favoring China is developing in their relationship that decreases 
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Russia’s overall security and, in turn, could be the source of security dilemma driven 
competition between the states. 
The economic interdependence between Russia and China emerged from Russia’s 
initiative to increase energy exports to the Asia-Pacific after the 2008 global economic 
crisis amplified Russia’s lack of economic diversification.143 Russia looked to the Asia-
Pacific to provide a stable market for its energy resources after the faltering economies of 
its Western customers resulted in a reduced price and demand for hydrocarbon resources. 
Throughout the crisis, China’s economy remained relatively stable and, from the Russian 
point-of-view, was the logical entry to the rest of the Asia-Pacific market.144 The Western 
sanctions imposed on Russia after its 2014 activities in Ukraine further intensified Russia’s 
push towards China, as the sanctions largely prevented Western companies and Eastern 
U.S. allies from investing in future Russian energy projects.  
Although the Russian push east did technically diversify its customer base to the 
Asia-Pacific, the ultimate result was a series of agreements that locked Russia into 
providing China with a majority of its eastern exports for the near future and allowed China 
to gain shares and influence over Russian oil and gas companies in Siberia and the Russian 
Far East which combined, increased Russia’s reliance on China. One of the first of these 
agreements was signed in 2007 in which the Chinese Development Bank agreed to loan 
the Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft and oil pipeline operator Transneft $US 25 
billion to develop Russian eastern oil fields and complete the East Siberia Pacific Ocean 
(ESPO) pipeline in exchange for providing China 300,000 barrels of oil per day for 20 
years.145 This agreement was amended in 2013 with stipulations that Rosneft would 
double its oil exports to China via the ESPO until 2041—with China prepaying $US 70 
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billion for oil that it would not begin to receive until 2016.146 The ESPO was supposed to 
enable Russia to diversify its Asian-Pacific customers by fulfilling its agreement with 
China via its spur that ultimately terminates in Daqing while accommodating the rest of 
the Asian-Pacific market via its Kozmino Bay spur on the Russian Southeastern Coast. The 
Kozmino Bay spur is supposed to allow the transportation of ESPO crude via sea shipping 
lanes throughout the rest of the Asia-Pacific. However, as a result of China’s prepayment, 
and to keep pace with its increased demand, Russia is required to export much of the crude 
oil coming from the Kozmino Bay spur to China, along with the oil from the Daqing 
spur.147 As a result, Henderson calculated that China purchased 85% of Russian crude oil 
sold to the Asia-Pacific in 2017 and concludes that Russia’s oil diversification “is in reality 
becoming a dependence on the Chinese market.”148  
China holds a similar agreement with Russia’s state-owned natural gas company 
Gazprom which Røseth states, that except for liquified natural gas (LNG), “will provide 
China a near buyer’s monopoly on Russian gas exports to Asia.”149 In 2014, Gazprom 
agreed to export 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas a year for 35 years to China upon 
completion of the Power of Siberia pipeline extending from Kovyktinskoye across the 
southern portion of the Russian Far East and into China.150 When it becomes operational 
in December 2019 and achieves the desired output, the Power of Siberia pipeline will 
elevate China to the second-largest consumer of Russian gas exports behind only 
Germany.151 Renewed talks are also underway to develop the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline 
which would allow Russia to export added natural gas to China from its fields in the Altai 
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region of Western Siberia.152 In addition, further talks to advance a 2017 agreement to add 
a Chinese spur to Russia’s existing Sakhalin-Vladivostok pipeline along its deep 
southeastern coast are also making progress and could come on-line relatively quickly once 
the states finalize an agreement.153 These new pipelines will reportedly increase China’s 
Russian gas imports to around 80 – 110 bcm per year—decidedly more than Germany’s 
2018 Russian imports of 53.4 bcm.154 These pipelines will not provide Russia direct access 
to the rest of the Asia-Pacific market and instead will elevate China to Russia’s most 
important natural gas customer and further increase Russia’s dependence on China. 
Furthermore, China is likely to import a majority of Russian LNG in the Asia-
Pacific, as well. Russia could diversify its Asia-Pacific customer base through LNG sales, 
in which gas is cooled to its liquid form and shipped by sea to other states in the region. 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in addition to China, all received LNG from Russia’s 
Gazprom in 2018 via its Sakhalin terminals in the Far East; however, China is steadily 
increasing its importance in this market, as well, and will likely dominate Russia’s LNG 
exports in the Asia-Pacific.155 Driven by its desire to transition from coal to gas as a 
primary source of energy, China increased its imports of LNG by 52% in 2018, according 
to the McKinsey Global Institute, and plans to increase its import capacity by four times 
its current capability by 2030.156 In a 2018 survey of LNG forecasts, Sandalow et al. found 
that China is likely to overtake Japan as the world’s largest importer of LNG by the end of 
                                                 
152 Alex Forbes, “Russia’s Hunger for Second Eastern Gas Outlet Grows,” Petroleum Economist, 
February 15, 2019, https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/europe-
eurasia/2019/russia-s-hunger-for-second-eastern-gas-outlet-grows. 
153“Gazprom to Expand Pipeline to China,” Interfax, October 3, 2018, 
http://interfaxenergy.com/article/32771/gazprom-to-expand-pipeline-to-china. 
154 Andres Cala, “Russian Gas Pipeline to Curb China’s LGN Appetite – Experts,” Montel News, 
November 29, 2018, https://www.montelnews.com/en/story/russian-gas-pipeline-to-curb-chinas-lng-
appetite--experts-/958065. 
155 Sakhalin Energy, Sustainable Development Report 2018 (Sakhalin, Russia: Sakhalin Energy, 
2018), 49, http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/media/sd_report/. 
156 McKinsey Global Institute, 2018 Gas & LNG Market Highlights (Washington, DC: McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/solutions/energy-insights/global-gas-lng-outlook-to-
2035/~/media/3C7FB7DF5E4A47E393AF0CDB080FAD08.ashx; Ariel Cohen, “China to Quadruple LNG 




2020 and is expected to be the main force behind the continued growth of the LNG 
market.157 Conversely, the IEA forecasts that the demand for LNG in Japan and South 
Korea will level out with only a slight increase through 2040.158 China has already begun 
to secure its LNG imports from Russia, and the state-owned China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) has an agreement in place with Russian LNG company Novatek to 
receive 3 million tons of LNG per year for 15 years from its Yamal LNG Project in Russia’s 
Arctic region.159 This agreement has a similar impact as the pipeline agreements on 
Russia’s diversification in the Asia-Pacific by ensuring that China receives a bulk of the 
Yamal LNG exported to the region. The Yamal LNG Project relies on the Northern Sea 
Route to maximize profits in the Asia-Pacific but is currently only trafficable along the 
Asia-Pacific leg from June to November. Although the Yamal LNG Project has an output 
capacity of 16.5 million tons of LNG per year, with such a short shipping timeframe, 
China’s guarantee of 3 million tons ensures that much of the LNG exported to the Asia-
Pacific lands in China.160 LNG from Yamal can travel to the Asia-Pacific via the European 
leg of the Northern Sea Route, but China’s agreement is the only one that stipulates a 
specific destination for Yamal gas, and with China’s increased demand much of the new 
LNG will still likely go to China. Novatek is currently developing a second Arctic LNG 
project called Arctic LNG 2 which may assist Russia in diversifying its customers in the 
Asia-Pacific, but agreements for LNG purchases have not been made, and the first train of 
LNG is not expected to ship until 2023.161 As such, although LNG holds the potential to 
increase Russia’s diversification in the Asia-Pacific, China’s increased demand coupled 
with a drop off of in demand by other Asia-Pacific states, namely Japan and South Korea, 
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likely means that Russia’s current and future primary gas market in the Asia-Pacific will 
remain in China, and with it, its level of dependency will likely increase. 
Increased competition in the Asia-Pacific and the European market that it has 
traditionally dominated deepens Russia’s reliance on the Chinese hydrocarbon market. 
Russia is somewhat of a latecomer to the Asia-Pacific market and Japan, South Korea, and 
India, the region’s major hydrocarbon importers, outside of China, turned mostly to the 
Middle East to meet their energy needs. This left Russia with an uphill battle in its push to 
gain a foothold in the region. Adding to its difficulties, both Australia and the United States 
added to the competition in the Asia-Pacific oil and gas markets, and both look to grow 
their presence in the future. Australia has developed into one of the world’s top LNG 
exporters with 62.7 million metric tons exported in 2018, which is projected to increase to 
74.9 million metric tons in 2019.162 Australia’s location gives it easy access to shipping 
lanes throughout the Asia-Pacific which provides it an advantage over Russia, especially 
when compared to the Northern Sea Route that Russia depends upon to transport its Arctic 
supply to the Asia-Pacific market. This enabled Australia to gain significant market shares 
in the Asia-Pacific, and according to Australia’s Office of the Chief Economist, it held 26% 
of Japanese, 17% of Chinese, 12% of South Korean, and 7% of Indian LNG imports in 
2018 and is seeking to increase these shares.163  
For its part, the United States is poised to make a significant impact on the oil and 
gas market in the Asia-Pacific as a result of its shale revolution. The shale revolution, in 
which water, sand, and chemicals are injected into shale rock to fracture the formations 
and extract deposits of oil and gas, has changed the complexion of the energy market. The 
United States, once over-reliant on oil and gas imports, benefitted immensely from the 
shale revolution and has achieved near energy independence. The United States is now the 
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world’s largest producer of both oil and gas and is projected to be a net exporter by 2020.164 
The major players in the Asia-Pacific are readily welcoming U.S. exports which originate 
from a more stable partner and are outside of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) purview, who until recently held the almost unrivaled ability to 
manipulate both supply and price.165 For Japan and South Korea in particular, U.S. exports 
represent an opportunity to solidify their already strong alliances with the United States 
further and reduce their reliance on imports from more geopolitically volatile states such 
as Iran and Russia. Though the ties are not quite as strong, the scenario is similar for India 
who maintains a relatively stable relationship with the United States and is drawn closer 
by contentious relations with the Middle East, the source of much of its energy imports.  
The Middle East is also not remaining idle as Qatar, the current largest producer of 
LNG, looks to increase its production from 77 million tons to 110 million tons a year, with 
its increased output aimed at the major importers in the Asia-Pacific.166 Overall, the 
prospects for Russia to make more than incremental gains in the Asia-Pacific oil and gas 
market is limited and further pushes it to rely on China. 
Europe is also increasingly becoming a more costly market for Russia, which 
pushes it towards greater reliance on China. As a collective, the European Union (EU) is 
the largest consumer of Russian hydrocarbon resources with 324.7 million metric tons 
purchased in 2017 at the cost of $US 86.6 billion.167 The proximity of Russia to Europe 
makes it one of Europe’s most economical sources of oil and gas with the various pipelines 
from Russia keeping prices down relative to other potential sources. Several European 
states are highly dependent on Russia with the Baltic States and much of Southeastern 
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Europe almost entirely dependent on Russia as a primary source for its energy needs.168 
This, however, is starting to change. Prompted by Russia’s use of this dependency as 
political leverage, including shutting off gas to Ukraine in 2006, 2009, and 2014, the EU 
has taken steps to liberalize its energy market to foster competition and prevent 
overreliance on any one source.169 The EU is particularly concerned with natural gas as 
the regionalized nature of the gas market makes the economic viability of sources 
dependent on transportation costs, in which Russia has an advantage over other sources. 
To compensate, the EU is developing an integrated internal energy market with electricity 
and gas fully interconnected between states.170 Europe will be able to take advantage of 
other sources of gas outside of Russia and flex supplies across the EU in a more economical 
fashion. In the interim, the EU is actively seeking ways to diversify its energy sources 
which threaten to reduce Russia’s shares of the market and increase its reliance on China. 
Presently, Russia is facing competition in the European gas market from several 
sources that could reduce its market share. First, like the Asia-Pacific, increased LNG 
production is starting to reach the European market. Australia, Canada, and East Africa, 
amongst others, have all served as new sources of LNG for Europe.171 U.S. LNG from 
shale gas is also competing on the European market, and the United States actively seeks 
to increase its exports to Europe as an alternative to Russian gas. Along with increased 
exports by the United States, U.S. shale gas has freed up other sources of gas for the 
European market, such as gas from Qatar, previously exported to the United States.172 
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Several EU states increased their LNG regasification capabilities to take advantage of the 
increase in supply, and competition for Russia will continue to grow as the integrated 
market comes online. Once interconnectors are in place, LNG can be transported to easily 
accessible and economical LNG regasification points along Europe’s coast and transferred 
via pipeline to states where Russian gas currently dominates the market. 
The EU is also actively working to increase its access to pipeline sources outside 
of Russia through its effort to open its Southern Gas Corridor. According to the European 
Commission, this project “aims to expand infrastructure that can bring gas to the EU from 
the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean 
Basin.”173 The Southern Gas Corridor initiative is presently gaining momentum with 17 
states participating in the fifth meeting of the Southern Gas Corridor Advisory Council 
held in February 2019 and gas from the first stage of the project is set to make its way from 
Azerbaijan to Italy in 2020 via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.174 By 2029, the EU seeks to 
import 20—25 bcm of gas per year through this corridor, with the ultimate goal of 
increasing this to 80—100 bcm per year.175 As the output from the Southern Gas Corridor 
continues to increase, Russia will face significant competition in Europe and particularly 
in two of its biggest markets in Italy and France, which will further threaten its market 
share and increase its reliance on China.  
Last, a series of significant natural gas discoveries off the coasts of Israel, Cyprus, 
and Egypt look to make the Eastern Mediterranean an increasingly viable alternative to 
Russian gas for Europe. Four of the major gas fields alone—the Tamar and Leviathan 
(Israel), Aphrodite (Cyprus), and Zohr (Egypt) fields—contain around 1.85 trillion cubic 
meters of gas with a potential output of around 80 bcm per year.176 In January 2019, Israel, 
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Cyprus, and Egypt along with Italy, Greece, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, came 
together to form the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) with the goal of 
establishing a regional gas market and developing new and existing means to export excess 
reserves to take advantage of these discoveries.177 With this framework, the region is 
primed to become a significant exporter of gas to Europe and are taking steps to make this 
a reality. 
In March 2019, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel signed a new agreement as a follow-up 
to the initial 2018 agreement to develop the EastMed pipeline which will provide gas to 
Southeast Europe from Israeli and Cypriot reserves via a pipeline that connects Israel, 
Cyprus, Greece, and Italy.178 This pipeline is a focus of both the EU and the United States 
as a means to help Europe diversify its natural gas supply away from Russia. The EU 
designated the pipeline as a “Project of Common Interest” which means that it considers 
the project important to meeting its energy goals and entitles it to funding and other 
regulatory concessions meant to accelerate project completion. The United States signaled 
support for the pipeline by sending U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to attend the sixth 
trilateral meeting between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, where they reached the new 
agreement. With the backing of the EU and the United States and a renewed commitment 
from Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, the project is likely to move forward with Israeli Energy 
Minister Yuval Steinitz indicating that construction on the pipeline is expected to start in 
2020 and completed around 2026.179 Once complete, Europe could receive up to 40 bcm 
of gas per year from the pipeline, which will present even more competition to Russian 
gas.180  
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Another option for EMGF gas to reach the European market is through LNG 
exports. Egypt possesses sufficient LNG processing and export capabilities to make it a 
distribution hub for the region’s natural gas exports and is quickly becoming a new source 
for Europe.181 Egypt rapidly put its Zohr gas field, the largest in the Mediterranean to date, 
into operation in 2017, which allowed it to meet its domestic needs and halt gas imports.182 
Egypt looks to double its LNG exports to over 20 bcm in 2019, with Europe as a prime 
target for increased sales.183 Egypt also signed a $US 15 billion agreement with Israel in 
2018 to import Israeli gas over ten years and began talks in 2019 to construct a pipeline 
that will connect Israel’s Leviathan and Tamar fields directly to Egyptian LNG plants.184 
Israel already plans to send 7 bcm of gas a year to Egypt via the existing EMG pipeline 
once it reaches full capacity in 2020, and the new pipeline could significantly increase this 
amount.185 Cyprus also signed an agreement with Egypt in 2018 to build a pipeline to 
connect its Aphrodite field to Egyptian LNG plants, as well, which was approved by the 
Egyptian Parliament in January 2019.186 In addition, Israel is in talks with Exxon Mobile 
to develop a floating LNG processing capability explicitly aimed at increasing exports from 
its Leviathan gas field, a portion of which will likely end up in Europe.187 LNG inherently 
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costs more than pipeline gas and will be a significant determining factor in how competitive 
Mediterranean LNG will be in Europe. However, the region’s proximity to European 
regasification facilities increases the potential that it will be competitive with Russian gas 
and Europe has shown a willingness to purchase LNG despite the prevalence of Russian 
pipeline gas on its market. As such, as LNG capabilities continue to operationalize and 
exports increase, Mediterranean LNG will likely provide an additional source of 
competition for Russian gas in the European market—with Egypt providing competition 
as early as 2019. 
Russian gas projects aimed at increasing exports to Europe are also becoming more 
problematic. The EU is facing pressure both internally and from the United States to 
decrease its energy dependence on Russia. As a result, two of Russia’s new pipeline 
projects face significant obstacles. Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline, that when complete 
will traverse the Baltic Sea into Germany, is embroiled in a geopolitical battle that divided 
the EU and evoked a threat of sanctions by the United States against European companies 
that participate in the project.188 The EU reached a compromise in 2019, which likely 
ensures completion of the project, but future projects are likely to incur more staunch 
opposition.189 Likewise, Russia’s attempt to supply more gas to Southern and Southeastern 
Europe through its TurkStream pipeline project has met resistance stemming from the EU’s 
anti-monopoly regulations. These regulations are meant to prevent gas from entering the 
EU market from sources that own both the gas and its mode of transport. Gazprom owns 
both a majority stake in the TurkStream pipeline and the gas it intends to push, and the EU 
is attempting to block its gas from entering Europe.190 Combined, this makes for an 
unstable market for Russia, as it will continue to see market shares decrease along with its 
opportunities for higher throughput to Europe. Russia will likely need to increase the 
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number of concessions it offers European states, such as reduced prices, to maintain its 
market share in Europe. As a whole, Europe will increasingly become a more costly market 
for Russia and push Moscow towards greater reliance on China. 
For its part, China ensures that it is not overly reliant on Russian energy imports by 
maintaining access to a diverse number of sources. This diversification hinders Russia’s 
ability to harm China and provides China a greater level of security in the relationship. 
Although Russia is China’s largest individual supplier of hydrocarbons and will continue 
to increase its exports to meet Chinese demand, China’s energy sources are highly 
diversified, and it has more flexibility to shift between supplies to meet its needs. 
Collectively, China receives most of its oil and gas from states other than Russia. In 
addition to Russian pipelines, China has the ability to receive up to 22 million barrels of 
crude oil and 12 bcm of gas per year from its Myanmar oil and gas pipelines and up to 55 
bcm of gas from its Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan gas pipeline—which could increase 
to 85 bcm upon completion of a planned fourth line.191 China also receives vast amounts 
of oil and gas by sea from numerous states including Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iraq, Oman, 
Brazil, Iran, Kuwait, Australia, Qatar, Nigeria, and Malaysia amongst many others. 
Furthermore, according to Cole, China used the economic crisis between 2008 and 2009 to 
significantly increase its global investments in energy sources and by the end of 2013 
obtained assets in 29 states and holds oil concessions or investments in oil production 
capabilities across the globe.192 China could leverage these assets and accelerate 
development projects in these areas to compensate for changes in supply. Likewise, 
China’s wealth allows it to readily outbid other states for spot sales of oil and gas as its 
demand increases or in reaction to decreases in supply. Also, along with its traditional 
domestic reserves, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that China 
possesses the largest recoverable shale gas and third-largest recoverable shale oil reserves 
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in the world, which it has yet to tap into fully and they could develop if needed.193 This 
diversification of China’s energy supplies affords it a level of flexibility that ensures that 
although it is dependent on Russian oil and gas to a minor extent, changes to the Russian 
supply would harm China much less than the loss of the Chinese market would Russia. 
Overall, Russia is unable to truly diversify its customer base in the Asia-Pacific due 
to agreements with China that it readily made after the global financial crisis crippled 
Russia, emptied its monetary reserves, and Western sanctions left it with limited options. 
Russia is obligated to provide China with most of its oil and gas destined for the Asia-
Pacific for the next several decades, and this will likely continue, as pipelines are relatively 
permanent. The EU and the United States’ concerted efforts to break Europe’s dependence 
on Russia coupled with a growing portfolio of competition in the European market 
continues to perpetuate the herding of Russia’s oil and gas towards China, while China has 
shielded itself from depending on Russia through its diversification and flexibility in this 
sector. 
As a result, a budding asymmetric vulnerability favoring China continues to 
develop that increases the intensity of security dilemma dynamics between the states. 
Russian activities that impact China’s Russian oil and gas supply would harm China in the 
short-term, but China could react relatively quickly to compensate for the negative impacts 
of Russian actions by increasing throughput amongst its many sources. Russia, on the other 
hand, could not. Its overreliance on China provides it with limited flexibility in the oil and 
gas market and, as a result, its overall hydrocarbon-based economy. This gives China an 
offensive advantage in that it is much easier and less costly for China to harm Russia than 
the converse. Russia is susceptible to any Chinese activities that impact the price of 
hydrocarbons to which China has a somewhat unique ability to take advantage of. China is 
probably the only state, other than the United States, that can impact both supply and 
demand in the hydrocarbon market. As the world’s largest energy consumer and individual 
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energy market, actions that China takes to reduce its consumption would have a significant 
negative impact on overall global demand and lead to reduced prices and surplus supply. 
Russia’s lack of true diversification means that it would have to provide oil and gas to 
China at a reduced price while competing with the surpluses of other hydrocarbon states in 
places like Europe. The surpluses would also sell at a reduced-price and force Russia to 
either further reduce its prices or cede market share—with both options significantly 
hurting Russia’s economy. China could also use its untapped domestic sources and vast 
international holdings to increase the global supply of hydrocarbon resources which would 
also reduce prices and have a similar impact on Russia. Furthermore, Russia is susceptible 
to any Chinese activities which hinder its ability to diversify its economy through future 
efforts to expand its shares in other hydrocarbon markets or increase its exports in other 
sectors. As such, Russia is vulnerable vis-à-vis China and the resulting insecurity increases 
the probability that it will react to mitigate this vulnerability or to counter China’s actions 
that perpetuate it. 
5. To What Degree Do Expansion and Self-Preservation Impact the 
Security of China and Russia? 
When expansion is required to ensure states’ security, status quo states must “act 
like aggressors” to obtain security or risk losing ground to other states.194 These aggressive 
actions could be misinterpreted as malign and generate a reaction in other states, despite 
all preferring security guarantees.195 Likewise, when self-preservation is at stake, states 
are more likely to be fearful, misperceive states’ intentions, and react to other states’ 
actions. When both are present in the actions of states, the fear and urge to react is amplified 
and the intensity of security dilemma dynamics is further increased. 
The security of both China and Russia is predicated on economies whose strength 
arguably requires expansion in current and new markets. China’s rise to the second-largest 
economy in the world resulted from its ability to rapidly expand its share of the global 
consumer market by capitalizing on its cheap labor to maintain low costs for manufactured 
                                                 
194 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 187. 
195 Jervis, 187. 
55 
goods. As a result, China averaged close to a 10% growth in real gross domestic product 
(GDP) annually from 1979 to 2017 which afforded it great wealth and enabled it to increase 
its military strength and global influence.196 China continues to follow this growth strategy 
and must further expand into new markets to ensure steady growth. Additionally, China’s 
plan to increase its exports of entirely “Made in China” high-technology products to boost 
economic growth requires many raw materials that China does not possess domestically, 
and China must expand its efforts in other states to ensure greater access.197    
Likewise, Russia must also expand its international economic efforts to ensure its 
security. As a hydrocarbon exporter, the strength of Russia’s economy varies based on the 
price of oil. The 2008–2009 economic crises hit Russia hard and caused oil prices to remain 
low. As a result, Russia experienced increased negative or low real GDP growth rates from 
2009 to 2018.198 To shore up its economic strength, Russia must expand its hydrocarbon 
and arms sales in current and new markets, diversify its revenue streams through global 
industrial and consumer markets, and acquire access to the raw materials needed to 
reinvigorate its manufacturing sector. 
The survival of both states’ regimes, at least in part, depends on their ability to 
expand economically. The CCP has a social contract with the Chinese people in which it 
promised wealth, power, and the reinstatement of Chinese greatness, in exchange for 
unabated controlling governance of the state.199 The CCP has made progress in reaching 
these goals and brought millions of people out of poverty while improving the quality of 
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life for the Chinese people. However, China’s economic growth slowed, posting a 6.6% 
growth in real GDP in 2018, and it faces a wealth-distribution gap that threatens the 
legitimacy of the CCP.200 A 2018 International Monetary Fund working paper found that, 
despite a reduction in poverty, China’s income inequality is one of the largest in world and 
access to education and financial services such as bank loans and savings accounts that 
could help to alleviate the problem are more unequally distributed in China than in most 
advanced and developing states.201 This serves as a source of discontent for the Chinese 
people and poses a serious threat to the CCP’s rule. The ability of the CCP to address the 
wealth-distribution gap and quell this discontent rests on continued economic growth 
through expansion of its exports to new markets and ability to gain greater access to the 
raw materials necessary for its planned shift to increase its exports of high-technology 
products.202  
Russia’s Putin regime made its own social contract with the Russian people based 
around promises to improve living standards and return Russia to its great power status. 
The survival of the regime, at least in part, also depends on Russia’s ability to fulfill this 
promise which hinges on its economic expansion. The Russian economy flourished in 
Putin’s first two terms in office from 2000 – 2008, benefiting from a period of high oil 
prices. Life for the Russian people improved significantly, and Russia was able to reassert 
itself as a major power in the international system. This, however, did not last as the 2008–
2009 economic crises caused increased hardships for the Russian people with Russia’s 
negative or low real GDP growth rates offering little hope for the future. As of 2018, 13.2% 
of the Russian population fell below the poverty line, and in April 2019, the BBC reported 
on a survey conducted by the Russian state statistics agency Rosstat, in which 80% of 
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Russian households felt they had trouble making ends meet.203 Putin’s hostile foreign 
policy measures, including the annexation of Crimea and bolstering the Assad regime in 
Syria, temporarily distracted the Russian people from the economic downturn and in the 
process his appeal to Russian nationalism and the maintenance of Russia’s claim to great 
power status increased his popularity, enabled his reelection in 2018, and bought him time 
to solve Russia’s economic troubles.204 However, Putin is currently ineligible to run in the 
2024 election, and as the face of Russian nationalism, his absence likely means that 
Russia’s economic problems will be a key issue that decides the outcome and level of 
power his regime retains after the election. The Putin regime must improve the economy 
before the election which will involve expanding Russia’s hydrocarbon and arms sales in 
current and new markets. It could also mean reinvigorating its once strong manufacturing 
sector which will require not only expansion into new markets but also expansion to 
acquire the required raw materials that it does not possess domestically. 
With the security of the states and survival of the CCP and Putin regime predicated 
on economic expansion, the intensity of security dilemma dynamics between China and 
Russia are likely heightened. This increases the probability that Russia will react to its 
overreliance on the Chinese hydrocarbon market. Russia’s reactions may encroach upon 
China’s economic expansion which could exacerbate the action-reaction cycle of the 
security dilemma, as both must choose to ensure state security and preservation of the 
regime over their partnership.     
6. Discussion 
An examination of the Sino-Russian relationship outside of Sub-Saharan Africa 
indicates that the potential is high for security dilemma dynamics with China to drive 
Russian activities in the future. China’s actions to secure its energy resources supply 
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through Russia created an asymmetric vulnerability between the states that favors China 
and in the long-term decreases Russia’s overall security. As a result, Russia may have a 
heightened sense of fear that China will take advantage of this vulnerability which could 
combine with other existing fears to amplify tensions within Russia despite the states’ 
aligned interests in response to U.S. primacy and desire to maintain the status quo between 
them. For Russia, a deep-seated sense of victimization emanating from its shared history 
with China evokes fears of subjugation, retaliation, and encirclement that may inhibit its 
ability to gain a true feeling of certainty in the motives of China’s actions. The interstate 
communication processes that could ameliorate security dilemma dynamics between the 
two are present, but traditionally neither state is transparent with the intentions of their 
actions, and both states maintain a level of secrecy within their governments which calls 
into question the ability of communications between them to prevent misperceptions and 
dampen security dilemma dynamics. Two factors serve to exacerbate this dynamic: the 
necessity of economic expansion for Russian and Chinese security and the centrality of 
self-preservation in this expansion. The intensity of security dilemma dynamics between 
China and Russia are more likely to escalate as it reacts to its overreliance on the Chinese 
hydrocarbon market and attempts to diversify its economy. This reaction may encroach on 
China’s economic expansion and could exacerbate the action-reaction cycle—as both must 
choose self-preservation and security over their partnership.     
B. EVALUATION WITHIN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
This section applies the knowledge gained from the external evaluation to Sub-
Saharan Africa to assess whether Russia’s current activities in the region appear to be a 
reaction to security dilemma dynamics with China and predict Chinese and Russian 
activities within the region that could exacerbate existing dynamics between the states. It 
does so by answering two questions: Do Russia’s actions in Sub-Saharan Africa appear to 
be a reaction to its decrease in security vis-à-vis China? What Chinese or Russian activities 
in Sub-Saharan Africa could exacerbate the identified security dilemma dynamics between 
the states? The first question is meant to identify two types of balancing reactions to 
security dilemma dynamics: those that exacerbate the dynamics and those that mitigate the 
dynamics. Balancing reactions that exacerbate security dilemma dynamics are reactions to 
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a decrease in security which counters the initial action in a security dilemma in a way which 
decreases the security of other states. Balancing reactions that mitigate security dilemma 
dynamics are those that are a reaction to a decrease in security that do not directly counter 
another state’s actions or decrease the other’s security but are instead undertaken to 
increase the state’s overall security. The second question is asked to prompt a prediction 
of actions by China and Russia within Sub-Saharan Africa that could exacerbate existing 
dynamics between the states.  
In answering these questions, I find that Russia’s actions to increase its economic 
engagement and access to natural resources in the region appear to be balancing reactions 
to mitigate security dilemma dynamics with China and are not a direct reaction to its 
asymmetric vulnerability meant to decrease China’s security. Potential flashpoints that 
could exacerbate security dilemma dynamics between China and Russia in the future 
include China’s growing arms sales in the region, Russia’s potential entry into Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s high-tech consumer market, and its activities to obtain a greater share of the global 
hydrocarbon supply through Sub-Saharan Africa. 
1. Do Russia’s Actions in Sub-Saharan Africa Appear to Be a Reaction 
to Its Decrease in Security vis-à-vis China?  
Russian reactions to its insecurity resulting from its overreliance on Chinese oil and 
gas purchases could take two forms: balancing actions that exacerbate security dilemma 
dynamics and those that mitigate the dynamics. Russian actions in Sub-Saharan Africa that 
would fit the mode of exacerbating actions relative to China include those that aid Russian 
economic diversification efforts while in some way harming China’s economy, or 
increasing China’s reliance on Russian oil and gas by directly preventing China from 
securing access to sources in the region. For Russia, this may include actions such as 
blocking Chinese entry into Sub-Saharan Africa’s high-tech consumer market or securing 
exclusive access to essential metals or minerals in the region that China needs for its 
industrial sector. Mitigating efforts by Russia, on the other hand, would include less 
contentious actions that do not directly counter or harm China but assist Russia with 
increasing its economic capabilities. Examples of these types of actions include Russia 
increasing its exports and economic ties in the region and securing access to natural 
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resources without preventing China from doing the same. Although Russia likely does not 
think in terms of security dilemma dynamics with China, it appears that Russia’s actions 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are a part of a concerted effort to diversify its economy and shore 
up its economic revenue that is reminiscent of balancing actions to mitigate its decrease in 
security relative China and not a direct counter to Chinese actions.  
Russia has increased its activities to strengthen its economic cooperation with Sub-
Saharan Africa and take advantage of its economic opportunities. In 2017, Russia grew the 
value of its trade with Sub-Saharan Africa from a very low level in 2010, increasing it from 
$US 1.6 billion to $US 4.2 billion.205 In 2018, Russia joined the African Export-Import 
Bank, a pan-African bank established to promote and fund African trade, and made an 
agreement with Eritrea to construct a logistics center on the Red Sea, both of which position 
Russia to increase its exports to the region.206 Russia has also made deals with several 
Sub-Saharan African states to capitalize on the region’s lucrative telecommunications 
sector and demand for nuclear energy including telecommunications projects in Angola 
and nuclear power projects in Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Zambia. In addition, 
throughout 2018, Russia made agreements with Angola, Ethiopia, Namibia, Mozambique, 
and Zimbabwe aimed at increasing its economic cooperation with these states.207 Russia 
also initiated, planned, and will host the Russia – Africa Summit that is set to take place in 
late 2019. This summit will link around 3,000 African businesspeople and government 
officials to their Russian counterparts to further increase Russia’s trade and economic 
relations with African states.208 When speaking about the summit, Anton Kobyakov, a 
Putin adviser, was quoted in Modern Diplomacy, as saying, “Economies of most African 
countries develop progressively, and Africa will play an increasing role in the system of 
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Russia’s foreign economic relations in the long term, as the region becomes more and more 
attractive for trade and investment.”209 
Russia also increased its efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa to secure access to the 
natural resources it needs to expand the industrial and manufacturing sectors that are 
essential to diversify its economy. Though Russia is one of the most resource-rich states in 
the world, it lacks or faces depleted reserves of several minerals and metals key to 
manufacturing a wide assortment of potential export products and arms to include 
aluminum, bauxite, chrome, chromium, copper, manganese, mercury, nickel, tin, titanium, 
and zinc. Russian mining companies increased efforts to gain access to these and other 
mineral resources marked Russia’s return to Sub-Saharan Africa and it recently secured 
mining deals in Sudan (gold), Angola (diamonds), Guinea (bauxite), South Africa (uranium 
and platinum), and Tanzania (uranium). Russia’s highly publicized activities in the Central 
African Republic are also likely, in part, related to securing access to its large gold, copper, 
manganese, tin, and uranium reserves. In addition, each of the five states, Angola, Ethiopia, 
Namibia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, that formally pledged to increase economic 
cooperation with Russia in 2018, have significant reserves of at least two or more of the 
minerals and metals that Russia requires and these agreements will likely result in an 
increase in Russian mining in the states in the near future. 
Finally, Russia increased its profit-focused arms sales in Sub-Saharan Africa to 
shore up its revenue streams. As the world’s second-largest arms exporter, arms sales 
provide Russia with an additive source of income to its hydrocarbon sales and Russia has 
long used the revenue generated from arms sales as a stopgap during periods of reduced 
oil prices. Sub-Saharan Africa is an important market for Russia as its instability and 
familiarity with Russian arms stemming from Soviet-era ties, makes it a persistent source 
of income, despite many of the states’ poor economic status. According to the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia overtook Ukraine as the region’s 
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top arms exporter in the years spanning from 2014 to 2018 capturing 28% of the market.210 
Actual arms sales figures are difficult to come by due to many sales going unreported or 
conducted on shadow or black markets, but based on open-source data collected by SIPRI 
this translated to around $US 6.048 billion in 2017 alone.211 Since 2014, Russia has, also, 
reportedly made around 19 defense cooperation deals with states such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, 
Zimbabwe, and others.212 In contrast to Soviet-era transfers based on shared ideology, 
current Russian arms sales in Africa are, according to Nalbandov, characterized by a 
“nothing – personal, pure business approach” and Russia’s primary objective is to make a 
profit off the sales.213 Russia often attaches extensive maintenance and defense advisory 
contracts or requires access to natural resources as stipulations of its arms sales in Sub-
Saharan Africa to make them even more lucrative. One recent example of this is Russia’s 
arms agreement with the Central African Republic. Russian arms transfers in the Central 
African Republic were reportedly accompanied by an influx of Russian civilian defense 
advisors from the Wagner Group, notorious for its alleged involvement in the murder of 
three Russian journalists, and provided opportunities for Russian companies to purchase 
mining rights for gold and diamonds at a reduced price.214 
Russia’s economic ties in the Sub-Saharan Africa, however, pale in comparison to 
China’s and its current activities have little impact on China’s economic interest in the 
region. China has cultivated its relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1950s, 
which continued after the Cold War deescalated and other states lost interest. After Africa 
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underwent a series of economic reforms in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s that 
promised greater privatization of industries and increased trade opportunities, as Brautigam 
notes, China began to structure its aid and investments towards capitalizing on its markets 
and gaining access to natural resources.215 China’s investment in the continent started to 
pay-off in the early 2000s when trade between the two rapidly increased at a rate of over 
40% annum from 2001 – 2006, a vast majority of which occurred in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.216 This growth continued, and according to Schoen and Kaylan, China passed the 
United States and EU as Africa’s biggest trade partner by 2012.217 The total value of 
China’s trade with Sub-Saharan Africa vastly eclipses Russia’s at $US 165.4 billion in 
2017.218 China also actively seeks opportunities to expand its exports in Sub-Saharan 
Africa as a region that is not oversaturated with its products and, according to Taylor, 
whose customer base it perceives as being “more receptive to the type of inexpensive 
products that Chinese factories typically produce.”219 Russia does not have the 
manufacturing capacity to directly compete with China on this front and Russia’s attempt 
to increase its economic ties are not likely to harm China in the near term.  
Sub-Saharan Africa’s immense natural resources also position it as an important 
source of fuel for China’s economic growth and it has invested a significant amount of 
time, effort, and money to gain access to these resources that limit Russia’s ability to impact 
its supply. According to data collected by the American Enterprise Institute, China’s 
investments in Sub-Saharan Africa’s energy and metal/mineral sectors totaled $US 130.88 
billion of the $US 299.66 billion China invested in Sub-Saharan Africa from 2005 – 2018, 
with investments in the supporting transportation infrastructure adding another $US 96.06 
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billion.220 These investments allowed China to amass an extensive portfolio of natural 
resource exploration and extractions rights within Sub-Saharan Africa that ensures Russia 
cannot directly counter or hinder China’s access to the resources it needs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Overall, Russia’s increased activities to establish deeper economic engagement in 
Sub-Saharan Africa coincided with both increased Western sanctions and Russia’s growing 
reliance on China and both are likely important drivers of its actions in the region. Russia’s 
increased efforts to capitalize on Sub-Saharan Africa’s emerging economic markets, secure 
access to natural resources, and increase its comprehensive arms sales agreements are more 
suggestive of mitigatory balancing reactions than exacerbating ones because they support 
Russian economic diversification efforts without decreasing China’s security. Although 
Russia’s overreliance on China’s oil and gas purchases are in the early stages, as it 
continues to grow and Russia’s security decreases, it is likely that security dilemma 
dynamics between the two will become an increasingly important driver of its activities in 
the region. 
2. What Chinese or Russian Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa Could 
Exacerbate the Identified Security Dilemma Dynamics between the 
States?  
The activities of China and Russia in Sub-Saharan Africa that could exacerbate 
security dilemma dynamics between the two centers around each state expanding its 
activities to those that the other typically has a strong presence. For China, this manifests 
in its expanding arms sales in the region to which Russia is the top player. For Russia, its 
desire to obtain a share of Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic markets could eventually 
encroach on China’s long-awaited chance to do the same and its efforts to access Sub-
Saharan Africa’s oil and gas could contribute to reversing the economic symmetry between 
the states. These activities are directly related to security dilemma dynamics between the 
two as China’s expansion into the Sub-Saharan African arms market could decrease one of 
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Russia’s few sources of revenue outside of hydrocarbons and Russia’s actions to gain a 
share of the economic markets and access to natural resources are, in part, driven by the 
dynamics.  
China’s expansion into Sub-Saharan Africa’s arms market could exacerbate the 
security dilemma dynamics between the two by threatening one of Russia’s few sources of 
revenue outside of hydrocarbon resources. By producing low-cost “good enough” products 
that are roughly equivalent to those of other major arms producers, such as the United 
States and Russia, China is quickly growing what Li and Matthews label the “Made in 
China” global arms brand.221 According to SIPRI, China is now the fifth-largest arms 
supplier in the world, and as its technology continues to improve, China will more directly 
compete with Russia in Sub-Saharan Africa in the future.222 Chinese arms are an 
increasingly attractive option for the often conflictual, but cash-strapped states within Sub-
Saharan Africa for several reasons outside of their low prices and adequate function. China 
essentially allows states to swap resources for arms in the form of loans tied to access to 
natural resources, to which states in Sub-Saharan Africa have in abundance but lack the 
capital to develop the reserves themselves. China’s financial position also makes it more 
willing to transfer arms under favorable sales terms in exchange for influence and support 
in international arenas, such as the UN. As a result, China has gained significant shares of 
the arms market in Sub-Saharan Africa and is closing in on Russia. SIPRI found that, 
between 2014 – 2018, China accounted for 24% of all arms sales in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
while Russia accounted for 28%.223 These figures are also similar for Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s largest and most lucrative arms market, Nigeria, in which China held 21% of the 
market to Russia’s 35% during this same period.224  
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The competition between China and Russia in Sub-Saharan Africa’s arms market 
may escalate as Russia feels pressure to increase its sales in the region due to its growing 
insecurity as a result of its asymmetric vulnerability to China. As previously discussed, 
Russia’s arms sales are one of its few sources of diversification away from hydrocarbons, 
and it uses the revenue generated from arms to fill gaps in hydrocarbon sales. As Russia 
continues to feel the pressure of security dilemma dynamics with China, in the interim it 
will likely look to further increase its arms sales in Sub-Saharan Africa as it searches for a 
more long-term solution to its vulnerability. Russian arms sales in the region will 
increasingly meet competition from China which may generate a counter-reaction. The 
centrality of a strong economy to the survival of the Putin regime will put more significant 
pressure on Russia to react to protect its economic interests and the importance of Sub-
Saharan Africa to China’s overall expansionist economic interests, and the survival of the 
CCP increases the chances of a counter-reaction by China. 
An increase in Russia’s activities in Sub-Saharan Africa’s emerging economic 
markets is also a potential flashpoint for escalated competition between China and Russia. 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic markets are mostly underdeveloped, absent significant 
competition, and have enormous potential as a result of the region’s economic growth and 
a booming population and as such represents one of Russia’s best opportunities to diversify 
its economy away from hydrocarbons. According to the World Bank, many Sub-Saharan 
African states are projected to sustain annual real GDP growth rates equal to or better than 
China’s projected 6% through 2021 to include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda, and Ethiopia 
is projected to average one of the highest growth rates in the world during this period at 
nearly 9% annually.225 Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is around 1.02 billion people, and 
the UN projects that it will grow to over 1.4 billion by 2030 and over 2.1 billion by 2050.226 
This population is also becoming younger than most other markets and increasingly 
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urbanized. The middle and upper class in Africa is expected to make up around 42.69% of 
the total population in 2030, with much of it concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa.227 
Household consumption, which totaled over $1 trillion in 2015, is projected to reach over 
$1.4 trillion in 2025, with actual figures likely much higher as most purchases occur in 
untracked informal markets.228 This economic growth coupled with its large population 
means that Sub-Saharan Africa is an increasingly attractive market to both China and 
Russia for retail and consumer goods, high-technology products, and construction and 
engineering industries.  
Russia has several advantages that may threaten China’s long-cultivated efforts to 
increase its share of Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic markets in the future and could spark 
an action-reaction cycle between the states. Russia is experienced in manufacturing high-
technology industrial products, such as machinery, and possesses significant intellectual 
capital in the construction and engineering industries to make an immediate impact on Sub-
Saharan Africa’s markets as its efforts to increase its economic ties in the region comes to 
fruition. Russia could also hinder China’s forthcoming efforts to introduce more high-end 
consumer products in Sub-Saharan Africa as part of its transition to manufacturing and 
exporting more of these products in the future. Russia already produces many high-end 
consumer products such as computers, televisions, and household appliances and Russia’s 
ongoing efforts to increase trade with Sub-Saharan Africa may allow it to gain much of the 
high-tech consumer goods market in Sub-Saharan Africa prior to China’s entry. This could 
also provide Russia a foothold in Sub-Saharan Africa’s consumer market that, as it 
continues to mature and demand for higher quality goods increases, enables it to compete 
with China’s lower-end products. Increased competition with Russia could generate a 
counterreaction by China to protect its economic interests that are further intensified by the 
centrality of economic expansion and growth to the legitimacy of the CCP. 
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Russia’s actions to gain access to Sub-Saharan Africa’s oil and gas reserves may 
also encroach on China’s ability to do the same and could exacerbate the security dilemma 
dynamics between the two in the future. Russia does not need to import hydrocarbons from 
Sub-Saharan Africa for domestic use but increasing its control of external reserves could 
enable it to gain a more significant share of the global supply and reduce the ability of its 
current export markets, such as China and Europe, to diversify away from Russian sources. 
Russian oil and gas companies have already gained several extraction agreements with 
Sub-Saharan African states and are increasing their efforts to capitalize on them. Lukoil, a 
Russian oil company, began explorations in Cameroon, Ghana, and Nigeria in 2014 and 
has on-going projects to extract the oil and gas from these sites and in 2018 Rosneft 
obtained rights to oil and gas blocks in Mozambique fields.229 If Russia were able to gain 
a more significant share of the global supply through Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions 
it could reverse the symmetry of the interdependence between it and China to which China 
will likely react to prevent. Undoubtedly, China wants to ensure its energy security and 
does not want another state to gain an advantage over it in this area. This puts pressure on 
China to react to ensure its access to Sub-Saharan Africa’s oil and gas and could exacerbate 
security dilemma dynamics between the states. 
3. Discussion 
Russia’s actions to increase its economic engagement and access to natural 
resources in Sub-Saharan Africa resemble balancing actions to mitigate security dilemma 
dynamics with China. Russia’s growing overreliance on Chinese oil and gas purchases as 
a primary source of economic revenue is likely putting at least some pressure on it to 
diversify its economy and shore up its hydrocarbon revenue, but Russia’s asymmetric 
vulnerability to China is in its infancy, however, and other factors are also at play. Western 
sanctions that limit Russian export potential and its ability to court Western investments 
for domestic natural resource exploration are also a probable reason for Russia’s actions in 
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Sub-Saharan Africa. Russia’s desire for recognition as a great power is another likely 
reason for Russia’s return to Africa as activities, such as its defense advisor roles in Sub-
Saharan Africa, are essential to this claim. Additionally, Africa’s ability to sway decisions 
in the UN is attractive to Russia and solicits actions to gain favor in the region. However, 
as Russia’s reliance on China continues to grow, the security dilemma dynamics could 
become an even more important driver of Russia’s actions in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
future. 
China, on the other hand, has a long-standing relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa 
and its actions in the region are not motivated by security dilemma dynamics with Russia, 
but by the CCP’s rule hinging on economic growth. This, however, does increase the 
potential of a Chinese counteraction to any reaction by Russia that threatens its potential 
for economic expansion. China’s economic standing affords it greater patience in its 
reactions that ensure the dynamics between the two are not likely to spiral to the point of 
war, but China is likely to vigorously defend its interests in Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic 
markets and natural resources against increasing Russian competition. Russia’s attempt to 
gain a greater share of the global oil and gas supply in Sub-Saharan Africa may also 
generate a counterreaction from China as it looks to maintain its asymmetry over Russia. 
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Like Kennan’s assertion that the Soviet Union contained the “seeds of its own 
decay,” so too does the Sino-Russian partnership—the oil and gas that brought them 
together also has the potential to break them apart.230 The findings of this thesis indicate 
that the potential is high for security dilemma dynamics, centered around Russia’s growing 
reliance on China’s oil and gas market, to drive competition between the two. Although 
their interests are largely aligned and they avoid conflicts of interest, Russia’s economic 
vulnerability vis-à-vis China puts pressure on it to react to limit China’s ability to inflict 
costs on it. This is perpetuated by Russia’s deep-seated sense of victimization emanating 
from its shared history with China that evokes fears of subjugation, retaliation, and 
encirclement which impedes its ability to gain certainty in the motives of China’s actions. 
A competitive action-reaction cycle that tears the partnership apart could ensue as Russia 
takes actions to diversify its economy that hinders China’s own economic expansion or as 
China conducts actions that, as a result of the vulnerability, increase Russia’s insecurity. 
All of which is exacerbated by the necessity of expansion for both states’ economic growth 
and their regimes’ reliance on this growth as a source of legitimacy to maintain control.  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, however, Russia’s actions thus far serve to mitigate the 
security dilemma dynamics between the two and leaves open the possibility for the states 
to take the same pragmatic approach to competition in Sub-Saharan Africa that they do in 
other regions. This would likely take the form of China capitalizing on the Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s economic growth potential while allowing Russia to handle security in the 
region—to the benefit of both. If this were to occur, the United States’ influence in Sub-
Saharan Africa could be significantly reduced, especially as it appears to be retrenching 
from the region. The security dilemma literature provides some insight into the steps the 
United States could take to increase competition between the two and possibly prevent this 
from happening. 
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First, the United States should make a concerted effort to create or perpetuate 
uncertainty in China’s and Russia’s perceptions of the other’s motives. Doing so, could 
lead to the states misinterpreting actions by the other as malign and incite an action-reaction 
cycle that hinders their cooperation. Russia, as the weakest in the partnership, is most likely 
to escalate competition between the states and should be the target of U.S. efforts. Russia 
fears encirclement by the United States and NATO, and China’s integration in the global 
economy and reluctance to challenge the United States to a greater extent causes Russia to 
fear that China will join this effort. The United States should avoid actions, such as trade 
wars and portraying China as a threat, that compromise this fear and are counterproductive 
to dividing the Sino-Russian partnership. Russia also fears that China will use its 
preponderance of power to take advantage of it or regain control over territory China 
conceded to Russia when the roles were reversed. The United States should develop a 
comprehensive information campaign targeting the Russian oligarchs and future political 
leaders that highlights the disproportionate way in which the states’ business deals, 
especially in the energy sector, favor China, and China’s failure to fulfill promises of 
significant development and investment in the infrastructure in the Russian Far East. This 
could create further doubt that China’s interactions with Russia are benign and that 
cooperation with China is mutually beneficial which may cause the oligarchs and political 
leaders to put greater pressure on the state to react to its asymmetric vulnerability with 
China and compete more directly. The United States should also support Russian leaders 
in the Far East in their efforts to convince the government and Russian people of an 
imminent Chinese take over in that portion of the state. This plays into Russian fears of 
subjugation at the hands of China and could illicit a nationalistic call to counter its 
asymmetric vulnerability to China to prevent its perceived subjugation by China. Overall, 
the United States should leverage the role-reversal that made China the “big brother” in the 
relationship to highlight China’s preponderance of power and ability to harm Russia that 
may generate a greater response to its asymmetric vulnerability with China.  
Second, the United States should take actions to increase Russia’s asymmetric 
vulnerability with China. The United States should enact policy that decreases Russia’s 
share of the oil and gas market in Europe and prevents the diversification of its customer 
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base. This would include expanding current sanctions that target future oil and gas projects 
to those already underway to prevent the completion of projects, such as Nord Stream 2 
and TurkStream, that threaten to increase Russia’s throughput to Europe. This would also 
entail expanding current sanctions that target Russian external LNG projects to its domestic 
ones to limit its ability to expand its customer base in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, the 
United States would need to ensure it provides viable alternatives to Russian oil and gas to 
Europe and the Asia-Pacific and support European energy diversification efforts. This 
would involve maintaining competitive prices on U.S. shale oil and gas and increasing its 
throughput to Europe and the Asia-Pacific. It would also involve providing incentives to 
U.S. companies for participation in projects such as those in the Eastern Mediterranean that 
look to provide Europe with alternatives to Russian oil and gas. The United States should 
also put greater pressure on European countries, and particularly Germany, to break their 
dependency on Russia to ensure they are more receptive to alternative sources. These 
efforts combined would limit Russia’s production potential and ability to diversify its 
customer base, while decreasing its share of the global oil and gas market and further 
increase its reliance on China’s oil and gas markets. This would put greater pressure on 
Russia to react to its vulnerability with China and increase the potential for direct 
competition that divides the partnership and prevents them from taking a pragmatic 
approach to cooperation in places like Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Overall, the United States cannot afford to allow China and Russia to develop their 
partnership into a full-fledged alliance aimed at upending the international system. 
Although China claims to want a peaceful rise, this does not mean it wants to remain second 
to the United States forever. China has already started to take a more assertive role in the 
international system and at some point, will likely challenge the United States for its top 
spot. China will not be able to do so, however, without allies to which Russia is one of the 
first candidates. If the United States can prevent China from obtaining powerful allies, it 
could prolong its primacy. Understanding how the security dilemma causes two status quo 
states to vigorously compete for security despite neither side truly wanting to could enable 
the United States to develop strategies that prevent Chinese led alliances from forming.  
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